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Under the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act, whistleblowing has become big business. The Act’s qui tam provision empowers private parties, called relators, to bring suit on behalf of the government for frauds committed against it—
and to receive substantial portions of that recovery. Relying on the award-sharing
provision to draw out relators with inside knowledge of complex and well-hidden
frauds, the government uses these qui tam suits as a critical part of its regulatory
policy. The recent history of the Act shows that it has done this to great effect: the
government recovers billions of dollars annually from fraudulent contractors
through relators’ suits.
However, the Act has become something of a victim of its own success. The
promise of big rewards for relators has led to a dramatic increase in the number of
suits overall and, especially, in the number of dubious claims costing valuable prosecutorial resources. In response to the increase in meritless suits, the government has
resolved to more aggressively seek dismissal to sort the wheat from the chaff.
The circuit courts of appeals have split over the proper dismissal standard.
The first approach, created in United States ex rel Sequoia Orange Co v BairdNeece Packing Corp, requires the executive branch to explain why dismissal is justified by cost-benefit analysis. The second approach, created in Swift v United
States, offers near plenary dismissal power to the government. Sequoia, in permitting relators to probe the government’s reasoning, encourages meritless and strategic
suits, while stunting the government’s ability to respond to this increase. Swift, in
denying relators a meaningful opportunity to object, discourages meritorious relators from bringing suit. Beyond their suboptimal incentive structures, neither approach fully comports with the text and legislative history of the 1986 amendments,
and both raise serious constitutional concerns. As such, this Comment offers a new
standard of dismissal that resolves the incentive, interpretive, and constitutional
issues.
To address these issues, this Comment turns to an area in which courts and
legislatures have long worked to create a standard that draws out only the meritorious claims: shareholder derivative lawsuits. Analogizing the executive to a Special
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Litigation Committee, this Comment adapts the business judgment rule to the qui
tam context. Because government attorneys lack the independence and bias concerns
traditionally associated with actual board members, this Comment argues that New
York’s deferential application of the business judgment rule to SLC decisions can be
transposed with great success to the qui tam context. Such an “Executive Judgment
Rule” would guarantee that the government’s review of the relator’s claim meets its
statutory duty of “diligent investigation,” but would deny more probing judicial review without good cause. This approach not only remedies the interpretive and constitutional shortcomings of both current approaches, but also strikes the optimal incentives balance by assuring serious relators that their claims will be fully
investigated without encouraging frivolous suits.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the False Claims Act1 (FCA), blowing the whistle can
pay—and it can sometimes pay a lot. A successful whistleblower,
even one who helped submit false claims to the government, can
earn millions for turning their coconspirators in. “[S]etting a rogue
to catch a rogue,”2 the FCA has recovered over $62 billion since 1986
with 7.3 billion of those dollars flowing to whistleblowers.3
Designed to rein in inflated and false claims submitted by
government contractors and suppliers, the FCA imposes liability
on persons and companies who defraud the government. As part
of a recognition that detecting such fraud “is usually very difficult
without the cooperation of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity,”4 the
FCA includes a powerful whistleblower section referred to as the
“qui tam” provision.5 Under this provision, private individuals,
termed “relators” for the purposes of qui tam litigation, may bring

1

31 USC §§ 3729–33.
33 Cong Globe, 37th Cong, 3d Sess 956 (1863) (statement of Sen Howard).
3
US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics—Overview *3 (2019),
archived at https://perma.cc/227C-FGJ2.
4
The False Claims Reform Act of 1985, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess
4 (1986).
5
31 USC § 3730.
2
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suit on behalf of the United States. These relators tend to be employee whistleblowers and are often previous participants in the
fraudulent activities themselves. As the Act intended, these relators use their specialized knowledge to uncover fraud in government contracts, procurements, and reimbursements—most often
in health care and defense contracts.
To begin a qui tam action, relators first file their complaints
under seal.6 A government attorney, most often from the Department of Justice (DOJ), then evaluates the allegations and decides
whether to intervene and assume “primary responsibility,”7 allow
the relator to continue on in the government’s name,8 settle,9 or
seek dismissal.10
Originally passed during the Civil War to combat defense
contractor fraud, the qui tam provision was revived in the 1986
amendments to the FCA (the “1986 Amendment”). To incentivize
whistleblowers to report fraud, the qui tam provision provides relators with between 15 and 30 percent of the total recovery as well
as attorneys’ fees and costs.11
The 1986 Amendment has been stunningly successful with a
staggering $62,102,439,394 in total recoveries since its passage.12
What began as a few dozen qui tam suits and relatively minor
recoveries has swelled into “the fastest-growing area of federal
litigation.”13 In 2019 alone, relators initiated 636 new qui tam
suits under the FCA and generated $2,210,401,366 in recoveries,
of which relators received over $270,000,000.14 By contrast, in
2019, the DOJ brought 146 non–qui tam suits under the FCA and
recovered $844,023,684.15
These substantial recoveries disguise the high costs that the
increasing number of qui tam actions impose on the executive
branch. Within a few years of the 1986 Amendment’s passage, the

6

31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
31 USC § 3730(b)(4)(A), (c)(1).
8
31 USC § 3730(b)(4)(B).
9
31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(B).
10 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A).
11 31 USC § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
12 US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *3 (cited in note 3).
13 Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 41 Pub Contract L J 813, 844 (2012).
14 US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *2 (cited in note 3).
15 Id.
7
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significant burden on government resources that qui tam litigation posed became clear.16 In a personal letter, the Director of the
Civil Division, Frank Hunger, remarked that FCA work already
consumed 40 percent of line attorneys’ days but represented only
28 percent of their recovery.17 The highly complex and factintensive nature of fraud suits compounds the difficulty of having
to accommodate and work with relators as coparties in the suit.
Not even counting the work of United States Attorneys’ Offices
and other agencies involved in reviewing qui tam suits, in 1992,
the DOJ reported spending over 20,000 hours to obtain dismissal
of 150 meritless suits.18 This was at a time when the Civil Division
fielded barely three cases each week; in 2019, the Division received more than twelve cases each week.19 This number is likely
to continue to grow rapidly.20
In response to this growth of time-consuming, frivolous litigation, the Director of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, Michael
Granston, encouraged line attorneys to seek dismissal in a 2018
leaked memo (the “Granston Memo”).21 Later that year, the DOJ
adopted the Granston Memo as its formal policy in revisions to
the Justice Manual, which highlighted dismissal as “an important tool to advance the government’s interests, preserve limited resources, and avoid adverse precedent.”22
The DOJ has already begun to make good on its commitment
to aggressively seek dismissal in meritless cases. For example, on
one day alone in December 2018, only months after the revisions
16 See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of Justice’s Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 Admin L J
409, 444 (1993).
17 Id at 444 n 162.
18 False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992, Hearing on HR 4563 Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong, 2d Sess 25–26 (1992) (statement of Stuart M. Gerson,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, US Department of Justice).
19 See US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *2 (cited in
note 3).
20 See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence
from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 Colum L Rev 1244, 1318 (2012) (describing the growth of
the qui tam bar and relator professionalization). See also Mathew Andrews, Note, The
Growth of Litigation Finance in DOJ Whistleblower Suits: Implications and Recommendations, 123 Yale L J 2422, 2440–47 (2014) (extolling alternative litigation financing
groups seeking and funding technical and complex, but extremely lucrative, qui tam suits).
21 Michael D. Granston, Memorandum: Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant
to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A) *3–7 (DOJ, Jan 10, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4STD
-HBY5.
22 US Department of Justice, Justice Manual 4-4.111 (Sept 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/NLK7-3DNM.
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to the Justice Manual, the DOJ filed motions to dismiss in eleven
qui tam suits.23 However, filing for dismissal is much easier than
attaining it, especially as the circuits are split over the proper
standard for dismissal.
The circuits to have considered the issue of dismissal have
adopted one of two approaches. The first is United States ex rel
Sequoia Orange Co v Baird-Neece Packing Corp24 (Sequoia). Handling the first dismissal action under the 1986 Amendment, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the district court’s “rational relation” test.25
Though the qui tam provision is essentially silent as to dismissal,
the district court fashioned a test requiring the government to
show that dismissal is justified by legitimate government interests. In contrast, in Swift v United States,26 the DC Circuit held
that the government’s dismissal power was “unfettered,” meaning
that relators have essentially no recourse where the government
seeks dismissal.27 These two cases provide the dueling dismissal
standards currently employed by courts.
This Comment argues that both standards fail to accurately
reflect the 1986 Amendment’s text and legislative history, raise
serious constitutional questions, and create undesirable incentive
structures. As to the statutory language and history, Sequoia creates serious burdens for the executive branch in seeking dismissal, while Swift ignores the text in giving relators essentially
meaningless hearings. As to the constitutional analysis, Sequoia
arguably infringes on the executive branch’s prosecutorial discretion by forcing the government to explain its nonenforcement decisions, while Swift arguably denies due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. And, most significantly, neither
standard adequately resolves the influx of meritless qui tam cases
at the heart of the DOJ’s more aggressive dismissal policy.
Sequoia indiscriminately encourages suits by guaranteeing every
relator the right to demand the government’s reasoning, while
Swift’s plenary dismissal standard discourages all relators from
taking the risk of bringing their cases.
This Comment proposes a new rule for adjudicating government dismissal of qui tam suits that comports with the text of the

23 DOJ Moves to Dismiss 11 Patient Assistance Services FCA Cases (Bass, Berry &
Sims, Dec 21, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/G95Y-BDHX.
24 151 F3d 1139 (9th Cir 1998).
25 Id at 1145.
26 318 F3d 250 (DC Cir 2003).
27 Id at 252.
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FCA, respects relators’ due process rights and the separation of
powers, and correctly calibrates the incentive structure. In fashioning the rule, this Comment draws on another area of law in
which courts attempt to protect meritorious cases while allowing
swift dismissal of meritless claims: corporate law. In both contexts, legislatures and courts struggle to strike the right balance
in allowing meritorious suits to move forward without overloading corporations and the government. Additionally, both the
shareholder and relator have partial, but real, interests in the
suit, and are putatively bringing it for the benefit of the larger
body. And, just as the DOJ reviews the relator’s complaint,
Special Litigation Committees (SLCs) review the shareholder’s
suit. Both are charged with taking a broader view of the situation
in determining whether litigation is justified.
Though it deals with shareholders rather than relators, corporate law has grappled extensively with the question of how to
strike the optimal incentive balance. This Comment advocates
importing New York’s approach to shareholder derivative suits
found in Auerbach v Bennett28 as a model for crafting a powerful
incentive regime. In doing so, a court would apply the business
judgment rule from corporate law to DOJ decisions to dismiss as
a sort of Executive Judgment Rule. This rule would allow relators
to challenge government dismissal only if they first prove that the
government’s investigation suffered from procedural defects—
such as a failure to review the relator’s complaint or interview
relevant witnesses—under the Act’s requirement that the government “diligently [ ] investigate.”29 Only after the relator showed
that the government failed to meet its statutory duty could the
court then more closely scrutinize the government’s substantive
reasoning for seeking dismissal. In doing so, the court ensures
that relators receive the minimum requirements of due process
while respecting the executive branch’s judgment and separation
of powers.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the
history and origin of the False Claims Act before examining the

28 393 NE2d 994 (NY 1979). As discussed at length in Part IV.A, this Comment takes
the minority Auerbach approach because it best applies to the DOJ. Whereas the majority
approach in Zapata Corp v Maldonado, 430 A2d 779 (Del 1981), was created to deal with
concerns of SLC partiality and impropriety, Auerbach assumes disinterest and good faith.
This better comports with the qui tam context, where the DOJ is akin to the model SLC,
with unimpeachable credentials and impartiality.
29 31 USC § 3730(a).
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outcomes and criticisms of the 1986 Amendment’s qui tam provision. Part II dives into the text and legislative history of the 1986
qui tam provision. Part III describes the Sequoia-Swift split, the
effects of those two approaches, and their interpretive and constitutional shortcomings. Part IV begins with a primer on special
litigation committees and the Auerbach standard before arguing
that their application in the FCA context would both remedy
Swift and Sequoia’s deficiencies and, crucially, best serve the public and relators by encouraging and protecting high-quality suits.
The proposed solution offers not simply a more accurate interpretation of the FCA’s text and history, but one that addresses the
constitutional concerns raised by the current approaches and creates the optimal incentive structure for qui tam suits.
I. THE QUI TAM PROVISION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:
HISTORY AND CURRENT PRACTICE
This Part first provides a brief history of the False Claims
Act. Following that, this Part examines the specific history of the
1986 Amendment before surveying its outcomes and criticisms.
By looking at the response, in practice and in academia, to the
revived qui tam provision—especially the calls for greater government control over relators—the significance of which standard of
dismissal courts apply becomes clear.
A. Brief History of the False Claims Act
Congress passed the first False Claims Act30 (FCA) in response to rampant defense contractor fraud in the Civil War.31
The FCA’s drafters included the qui tam provision as a means of
effectively uncovering and rooting out fraud the government
would otherwise be unable to discover.32 To encourage relators to
come forward, the Act offered generous rewards. Most notably, it

30 An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States,
12 Stat 696 (1863), codified as amended at 31 USC §§ 3729–33.
31 US Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers
over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec 21, 2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/96T6-63J3. Enraged by vivid stories of charlatans selling “sick mules,
lame horses, [and] sawdust instead of gunpowder” to unsuspecting Union quartermasters,
the public demanded congressional action. Id.
32 33 Cong Globe at 955–56 (cited in note 2) (“The bill offers, in short, a reward to the
informer who comes into court and betrays his coconspirator . . . ‘setting a rogue to catch
a rogue.’”).
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guaranteed the relator 50 percent of the recovery as well as attorneys’ fees.33 While the statute required the consent of the court
and federal prosecutors for any settlements,34 it provided no provision for government intervention, including dismissal, once the
relator commenced the action. What little caselaw exists supports
the proposition that this omission prevented the government from
dismissing suits.35
The Act remained relatively unchanged until 1943, after
Attorney General Francis Biddle moved to repeal the False
Claims Act in response to growing instances of “parasitical”
suits.36 Specifically, he alleged that relators increasingly would
read the criminal charges of an individual or corporation and immediately sue in civil court on those same charges of fraud for a
cut of the recovery.37
In response, Congress considerably reduced the relator’s role
and incentives. Among other restrictions, the 1943 Amendment38
removed the fixed reward for successful relators.39 This meant
that relators no longer were guaranteed 50 percent of every successful prosecution; rather, their payout, if any, was left to the
discretion of the government and court. In gutting the central incentive for qui tam suits—the guarantee of compensation—this
provision was tantamount to repealing the relator provision.40

33

An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds § 6, 12 Stat at 698.
An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds § 4, 12 Stat at 698.
35 See United States v Griswold, 26 F Cases 42, 44 (D Or 1877) (“But the rule of law
is, and the practice always has been, that a qui tam action is the action of the party who
brings it, and the sovereign, however much concerned in the result of it, has no right to
interfere, . . . except as specially provided by statute.”) (emphasis added).
36 Eliminating Private Suits for Penalties and Damages Arising out of Frauds
Against the United States, S Rep No 77-1708, 77th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1942); Eliminating
Private Suits for Penalties and Damages Arising out of Frauds Against the United States,
H Rep No 78-263, 78th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1943). See also Charles Doyle, Qui Tam: The
False Claims Act and Related Federal Statutes *6 (Congressional Research Service, 2009),
archived at https://perma.cc/B74H-2A28.
37 See Gary W. Thompson, A Critical Analysis of Restrictive Interpretations Under
the False Claims Act’s Public Disclosure Bar: Reopening the Qui Tam Door, 27 Pub Contract L J 669, 674 (1998).
38 An Act to Limit Private Suits for Penalties and Damages Arising out of Frauds
Against the United States, 57 Stat 608 (1943).
39 An Act to Limit Private Suits for Penalties and Damages § 1, 57 Stat at 609.
40 Following this amendment, qui tam suits dropped to an average of six cases annually until the provision’s revival in 1986. Elameto, 41 Pub Contract L J at 818 (cited in
note 13).
34
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B. The 1986 Amendment to the False Claims Act
The qui tam provision therefore largely remained a dead letter for the next forty years. However, the tide turned in qui tam’s
favor following a series of high-profile and embarrassing scandals
in the 1970s and 1980s involving defense contractor fraud.41 In
the “era of the $435 hammer, the $640 toilet seat cover, and the
$7622 coffee maker,” public outrage mounted over the perceived
ubiquity of defense contractor fraud.42 In response, Congress began to explore reviving the False Claims Act’s central tool: the qui
tam provision.
The Senate Report to the 1986 Amendment clearly states the
dual impetus for reenlisting the qui tam relator. First, there was
simply a staggering amount of fraud—the DOJ estimated that at
least $1 billion was lost each year in defense contractor fraud
alone.43 Second, Congress and government prosecutors recognized
that it was nearly impossible to uncover these frauds without
whistleblowers’ inside knowledge.44 On that point, the Senate Report squarely addresses the need for relators: “Detecting fraud is
usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who
are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent
activity. Yet in the area of Government fraud, there appears to be
a great unwillingness to expose illegalities.”45 The Report explains
that “S. 1562 increases incentives, financial and otherwise, for
private individuals to bring suits on behalf of the Government.” 46
Recognizing that this new, more complex, and highly technical fraud required an insider’s knowledge to uncover, Congress
passed the 1986 Amendment. To give the statute teeth, Congress
imposed treble damages and huge minimum fines for violations
of the Act.47 To incentivize relators, Congress guaranteed successful relators’ costs and attorneys’ fees, and, crucially, reinstated
the mandatory bounty provision—every successful relator would

41 J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 NC L Rev 539, 561 (2000).
42 Id. The Senate Report highlights the fact that nine of the ten biggest defense contractors “were under investigation for multiple fraud offenses” at the time of the amendments’ drafting. S Rep 99-345 at 2 (cited in note 4).
43 S Rep 99-345 at 2 (cited in note 4).
44 Id at 4.
45 Id.
46 Id at 2.
47 31 USC § 3729(a)(1).
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now receive 15 to 30 percent of the massive damages the Act imposed.48 The 1986 Amendment’s supporters celebrated the reinvigorated Act as “an opportunity without adding one more person
to the Federal payroll of enlisting support of thousands of people
in ferreting out fraud against the Government.”49
C. Outcomes and Criticisms of the 1986 Amendment
In order to begin explaining the centrality of the dismissal
standard, this Section will note some of the developments in qui
tam litigation since the 1986 Amendment, as well as survey the
major criticisms leveled against it. In surveying the data and responses of academics, this Section reinforces the Comment’s argument that the standard of dismissal is fundamental in both enabling the executive branch to successfully manage its cases and
enforcement as well as ensuring only meritorious suits are
brought.
1. The increase in qui tam suits after the 1986 Amendment
and limited government intervention.
Since the 1986 Amendment’s enactment there has been a
steady uptick in the number and value of qui tam suits. In 1988,
forty-three relators brought suits, and the DOJ grossed slightly
more than $2.3 million in qui tam recoveries.50 By 2019, 636 relators brought suit, and the DOJ grossed over $2 billion in qui tam
recoveries.51 However, just looking at the successful suits in aggregate fails to tell the full story. These massive recoveries disguise the significant number of dismissed and meritless suits
brought by relators.
While the government is extremely successful in winning and
extracting large recoveries in those cases in which it intervenes,
it only does so in less than a quarter of qui tam suits.52 About
95 percent of the cases in which the government intervenes result

48

31 USC § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
False Claims Act Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong,
2d Sess 417 (1986) (statement of John Phillips, Center for Law in the Public Interest).
50 US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *2 (cited in note 3).
51 Id.
52 Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department of Justice
to Rein in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U Cin
L Rev 1233, 1263 (2008).
49
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in settlement or judgment in favor of the United States53 with an
average total recovery well into the millions of dollars.54 When the
government does not intervene—some 78 percent of total cases—
only about 6 percent of those cases are successful, with an average total recovery of $75,000.55 As discussed below,56 resource constraints and a mismatch of incentives mean that outside of the
22 percent of cases that the executive branch prosecutes, there is
little reason to expect that the DOJ is closely monitoring the private parties litigating in the government’s name.
As the Granston Memo suggests, the DOJ is highly concerned
with these unmanaged cases—and it is those cases that animate
this Comment. Even assuming half of the relators drop their
cases following the government’s decision not to intervene, that
still leaves private citizens litigating almost twice as many cases
as the government. Furthermore, before the Granston Memo, the
DOJ sought dismissal for less than 1 percent of qui tam actions
filed.57 The consequences of these hundreds of uncontrolled suits
each year are critical for the government, contractors, and society
more generally. First, these numbers show that relators are
bringing too many meritless suits—suits that impose significant
costs on the government to monitor and, especially, on contractors
to defend against. Second, and relatedly, the high number of suits
proceeding without government intervention means that relators
exert substantial influence over the direction and expansion of
FCA liability. Both of these concerns are addressed in the following Section.
2. Criticisms of the qui tam provision in academic
literature.
Given the growing number of suits exclusively managed by
relators since 1986, the academic literature has coalesced around
a nested criticism of the qui tam mechanism. The first part of the
argument is that the perverse incentives of the qui tam provision
encourage cunning relators to file strategic, and often meritless,
53 David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 Pub Contract L J 225, 240 (2013).
54 See US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *2 (cited in
note 3). For a slightly dated but in-depth examination of comparative payoffs between
1986 and 1992, see Kolis, Comment, 7 Admin L J at 439–45 (cited in note 16).
55 Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev at 1263–64 (cited in note 52).
56 See Part I.C.2.
57 Steven L. Schooner, False Claims Act: Greater DOJ Scrutiny of Frivolous Qui Tam
Actions?, 32 Nash & Cibinic Report 59, 60 (2018).
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suits and discourage the DOJ from seeking dismissal because defendant corporations, not the DOJ, bear the cost of meritless
suits. The second part of the argument states that this abdication
of responsibility by the government leads to unnecessary, expensive litigation and uncontrolled FCA development. Given the
growth of suits, disincentives for government oversight and dismissal, and the serious effects of unconstrained relators, this Section helps explain the importance of a properly calibrated dismissal standard.
The first part of this critique is that the incentive structure
of qui tam, in conjunction with the lack of a meaningful threat of
dismissal or sanctions, encourages relators to bring dubious or
meritless suits, often in the hopes of quick settlements or as a tool
of corporate competition. Relators have strong incentives to bring
an action because their only real disincentive is the cost of filing
the suit itself. If the government intervenes, the relator is almost
assured of a payout.58 But even if the government does not intervene, the relator has three often cheap litigation options. First,
they can drop the suit. Second, they can seek settlement with
companies, who rightfully fear the Act’s massive treble damages
and per claim fines. Third, if they believe their case has merit,
they can pursue the suit and, in the event of a victory, receive
costs, attorneys’ fees, and an average $18,000 payout.59
One might believe that sanctions under Rule 11 would deter
relators, but Rule 11 may actually increase the number of frivolous suits due to its safe harbor provision and filing requirements.60 As relators have the ability to avoid sanctions by withdrawing their complaint at any time within twenty-one days of
the defendant’s service of the motion for sanctions,61 relators can
effectively immunize themselves from punishment. Furthermore,
58

Kwok, 42 Pub Contract L J at 240 (cited in note 53).
Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev at 1264 (cited in note 52).
60 Todd B. Castleton, Comment, Compounding Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring Relator
Information Under the False Claims Act and the 1993 Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 4 Geo Mason L Rev 327, 351 (1996) (“Under the new Rule 11, a potential
qui tam plaintiff suffers no penalty for filing a marginal or even frivolous claim. . . . As a
result, a potential qui tam plaintiff has nothing to lose and everything to gain by initiating
a suit, regardless of its merit.”). See also Charles Yablon, Hindsight, Regret, and Safe
Harbors in Rule 11 Litigation, 37 Loyola LA L Rev 599, 621 (2004) (“[T]he 1993 amendments had precisely the effect of making it significantly more difficult to win a Rule 11
motion” because it required defendants to file the Rule 11 motion before the court adjudicated the plaintiff’s claim—thus depriving the court and defendant of the “hindsight perspective” that encouraged sanctions.).
61 FRCP 11(c)(2).
59
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the safe harbor provision forces parties to bring Rule 11 motions
before the underlying merits of the claim are resolved.62 This eliminates the “hindsight perspective,” or bias, that encouraged courts
to bring down heavy sanctions on the losing party as the judge
and winning party presumed the other party’s loss meant their
complaint was likely frivolous.63 By providing protection from
sanctions and discouraging parties from seeking sanctions in the
first place, Rule 11 provides little deterrence to relators filing
meritless suits in the hopes of a quick payout. Compounding the
issue is that courts are seemingly wary of imposing sanctions; for
example, in 2015, only two FCA relators received sanctions,64 and
even then, in one case the court only applied sanctions after it
gave the relators three separate warnings.65 With an almost nonexistent government dismissal rate and impotent sanctions, relators currently have little to fear and much to gain in filing strategic and meritless suits.
Potential relators know the government is unlikely to find
and litigate these often complex and hypertechnical frauds on its
own.66 Given that the relator does not have to worry about the
government discovering the fraud first and reaping the entire recovery, the relator is incentivized to wait as long as possible before filing in order to obtain a greater payout.67 In United States v
General Electric Co,68 for example, the FCA relator first contacted
his attorney in 1987, when GE’s fraudulent receipt of government
payments totaled $13.1 million, but delayed filing suit for three

62

Yablon, 37 Loyola LA L Rev at 604 (cited in note 60).
Id at 621–22.
64 Richard Arnholt, Relators Beware—Sanctions Upheld for “Vexatious” False
Claims Act Suit (Bass, Berry & Sims, June 17, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/83J6
-X3W4.
65 United States ex rel Jacobs v Lambda Research, Inc, 622 F Appx 477, 479
(6th Cir 2015).
66 US Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers
over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec 14, 2016), archived
at https://perma.cc/D5JN-XVAA. The DOJ has repeatedly admitted that many complex
and health care crimes are undiscoverable without industry insiders. For an example of
such a fraud, see United States v Academy Mortgage Corp, 2018 WL 3208157, *1–2 (ND
Cal), where the relator revealed a false loan certification scheme which traded on the intricacies of Federal Housing Administration regulations. Without the relator, there is little
reason to suspect the fraud would otherwise have been revealed given its complex nature.
67 See Ben Depoorter and Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the
False Claims Act, 14 S Ct Econ Rev 135, 156–57 (2006); Beck, 78 NC L Rev at 635 (cited
in note 41).
68 41 F3d 1032 (6th Cir 1994).
63
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years, at which point the total fraud, and thus the relator’s reward, had more than tripled.69
The DOJ is not incentivized to control relators’ suits. Dismissal requires valuable line-attorney time and resources, while the
benefits are diffuse and flow almost entirely to a defendant often
unaware that a case against them was even being considered.
Furthermore, when a relator does win, the DOJ can expect an average recovery of $57,000.70 And, especially in Sequoia jurisdictions where the bar for dismissal is higher, the cost of dismissal
often exceeds the resources saved by an early termination of
the case.71
Given the failure of the current incentive structure, relators
essentially control the majority of qui tam litigation. As such, the
second part of the critique argues that this relator control leads
to ever-increasing FCA liability for contractors, as relators seek
the highest payout rather than stable and effective regulation.
The DOJ and relators’ lack of proper incentives in managing
and bringing these actions, respectively, has serious negative consequences on the development of FCA liability law. As Professor
Michael Rich explores at length, the category of qui tam action
most likely to proceed without government intervention is also
the most in need of government oversight: qui tam actions based
on establishing a novel theory of FCA liability.72 He lays out four
categories of suits defined by low and high payout on one axis,
and low and high likelihood of success on the other. When the
potential payout is low and the likelihood of success is low, relators and the government are unlikely to intervene,73 and this comports with the Act’s purpose of drawing out useful information.74
In contrast, when the potential payout is low but the likelihood of
success is high, relators are likely to pursue the case and the government is unlikely to intervene to conserve resources,75 and this

69

Id at 1037–39.
Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev at 1264 (cited in note 52).
71 See Patrick A. Barthle II, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative Analysis of the DoddFrank Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev 1201, 1233–35 (2012).
72 Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev at 1268 (cited in note 52).
73 Id at 1266.
74 Id (“The relator recovery structure of the FCA is intended to encourage whistleblowers to come forward with helpful information.”).
75 Id at 1266–67.
70
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comports with the Act’s purpose of having “10,000 lawyers . . . assisting the Attorney General.”76 Finally, when the potential payout is high and the likelihood of success is high, it is reasonable
to assume that the government will intervene.
The problem occurs when the potential payout is high, but
the likelihood of success is low. These cases tend to require either
extensive discovery chasing a smoking gun or a novel legal theory
of liability.77 Relators are not incentivized to pursue smoking gun
claims because, considering the low likelihood of success and the
exorbitant cost of discovery, the expected payout is likely to be
low. However, relators are incentivized to pursue novel theories
of liability because, compared to resource-intensive discovery, the
cost of producing a brief advancing a new legal theory of FCA liability is relatively low given the potential for a substantial payout.78 In both cases, the government is not incentivized to bring
suit as the likelihood of success is low and the cost of DOJ investigation and litigation is high.79 Professor Rich concludes that
“[a]s a result, relators exercise nearly unfettered prosecutorial
discretion in precisely those cases in which government oversight
is most essential.”80
Unconstrained relators seeking to open new areas of liability
have created significant uncertainty for government contractors
and even subjected them to billion-dollar suits for conduct that
was previously unobjectionable under the FCA. A successful case
based on a novel theory of liability substantially raises the incentives for other relators to rush in and sue contractors. For example, in 2003, a lone relator’s novel theory of “off-label” marketing
liability succeeded in a single district court case.81 That single
case led to a new theory of liability exponentially increasing
health care defendants’ exposure under the FCA. For example, in

76 89 Cong Rec 7606 (1943) (statement of Sen Langer). See also Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev
at 1267 (cited in note 55).
77 Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev at 1268 (cited in note 52).
78 Id at 1267–68.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 United States v Parke-Davis, 2003 WL 22048255, *7 (D Mass). For a richer discussion of relator-generated liability in the health care field, see generally Dayna Bowen
Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case
of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U Mich J L Ref 281 (2007).
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2013, Johnson & Johnson paid more than $2.2 billion for a single
off-label marketing suit.82
While ever-greater liability is a resounding benefit for the
plaintiffs’ bar, dramatic increases in liability raise the costs of
goods and services for the government and public.83 When confronted with an ever-harsher regulatory landscape, government
suppliers, especially health care providers and defense contractors, grow “cynical and alienated.”84 Contractors increasingly see
the government’s litigation strategy, or lack thereof, as based on
the pursuit of maximum recoveries rather than any principled approach to which activities create liability.85 As this distrust grows,
cooperation between the government and regulated industries deteriorates, which forces the government to rely on increasingly
coercive means of obtaining compliance.86 This more aggressive
posture starkly contrasts with the DOJ’s explicit preference for
cooperation and belief that it is far more effective in preventing
fraud.87 And, more broadly, in abdicating its gatekeeping responsibility, the DOJ fails its own articulated duty of “provid[ing] federal leadership” in “enforc[ing] the law” and “defend[ing] the interests of the United States.”88
Furthermore, when novel-theory claims are brought by unskilled or inexperienced relators, their failures can lead to mounting adverse precedent. Even if the DOJ seeks to pursue a new
theory of liability under the FCA, relators may have already created substantial adverse precedent, making it difficult for the
government to shape the future of FCA liability. This also has
serious negative consequences for effective corporate regulation.
82 US Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Johnson & Johnson to Pay More
than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov 4, 2013), archived at
https://perma.cc/DN8L-P3BV.
83 Matthew, 40 U Mich J L Ref at 293–95 (cited in note 81).
84 Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev at 1274 (cited in note 52).
85 Id. For an account of this effect in the health care sector, see Joan H. Krause,
“Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 Cardozo L
Rev 1363, 1414 (2002).
86 Rich, 76 U Cin L Rev at 1274 (cited in note 52). See also Depoorter and De Mot, 14
S Ct Econ Rev at 154 (cited in note 67) (“The DOJ has an interest not simply in prosecution
and punishment but also in generating goodwill to persuade companies to improve monitoring procedures.”).
87 US Department of Justice, Acting Assistant Attorney General Stuart F. Delery
Speaks at the American Bar Association’s Ninth National Institute on the Civil False
Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement (June 7, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/HVH2
-VX9R. See also Depoorter and De Mot, 14 S Ct Econ Rev at 152–56 (cited in note 67).
88 US Department of Justice, Mission Statement, archived at https://perma.cc/FV2L
-T58G.
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If the government cannot effectively threaten to regulate certain
conduct because of numerous failed relators’ attempts to do so,
this seriously weakens the government’s hand in demanding contractor cooperation.
To preserve its power to effectively regulate, stop wasteful
and meritless suits, encourage meritorious suits, and reclaim control over litigation brought in the nation’s name, the DOJ must
more aggressively seek dismissal. Unfortunately, the current
standards for dismissal either make dismissal too costly and encourage meritless suits, or make dismissal too cheap and discourage serious relators from bringing their suits.
However, the text and legislative history of the 1986 Amendment clearly point to a middle ground where serious relators are
guaranteed process and meritless suits are denied their strategic
benefit. The next Part will examine the text and history of the
1986 Amendment’s qui tam provision to lay the foundation on
which this Comment builds its argument for the Executive
Judgment Rule.
II. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1986
AMENDMENT’S QUI TAM PROVISION
This Part dives into the text and legislative history of the
1986 Amendment. Part II.A explains that the text of the qui tam
dismissal provision is brief and, compared with the other provisions governing government action, requires little from the government in dismissing a relator’s suit. Part II.B then examines
what little legislative history exists regarding dismissal. These
two sections reflect the relatively blank slate there is on which to
build a better dismissal standard that optimizes incentives and
avoids the issues posed by the current two approaches.
A. The Text of the 1986 Amendment’s Qui Tam Provision
Provides No Clear Dismissal Standard
The 1986 Amendment provides clear standards for most of
the points in a qui tam case in which the relator and government
interact. However, the Amendment is largely silent as to the
standard for government dismissal of a qui tam suit. By examining the varying language of the provisions governing these moments of interaction, this Section lays the foundation for the later
discussion of the proper dismissal standard. In particular, the differing language used in the provisions governing settlement,
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intervention, and dismissal is crucial to understanding the workings of the Act and for the later identification of the dismissal
standard Congress intended.
Every qui tam suit begins with the relator filing a complaint
under seal.89 The complaint then remains under seal for sixty
days to allow the DOJ to review evidence and decide its course of
action.90 For every suit, the Act requires that “[t]he Attorney General diligently shall investigate [the alleged] violation.”91 Following its investigation, the government may choose to intervene92
with the relator as coparty;93 decline to intervene and leave the
relator to conduct the suit;94 or seek settlement95 or dismissal.96
At almost every point during the course of the investigation
and suit, the Act provides the government with discretion to
pause or alter the suit. The government may intervene any time
before the complaint is unsealed and may, “for good cause shown,”
move for additional time to consider the complaint.97 The court
may stay discovery, whether or not the government intervened,
for periods of sixty days with successive showings by the government that discovery in the relator’s case would interfere with its
own ongoing enforcement actions.98 “[U]pon a showing of good
cause,” the court may allow the government to intervene after the
complaint is unsealed.99 The court may also limit a relator’s participation in the suit on a variety of grounds, including if unlimited participation threatens to interfere with or delay the government’s prosecution of the case.100
When the relator seeks dismissal of the suit or the government seeks settlement, the Act provides stronger guidelines. The
relator may dismiss the matter only with the written consent of
89 31 USC § 3730(b)(2). As a procedural matter, the complaint is brought “in the
name of the Government” the moment it is submitted. 31 USC § 3730(b)(1). Even if the
government declines to intervene, the relator continues in the government’s name. 31 USC
§ 3730(b)(1).
90 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
91 31 USC § 3730(a).
92 31 USC § 3730(b)(4)(A).
93 31 USC § 3730(c)(1). This is in contrast to the 1943 Amendment, which removed
the relator as a party once the government intervened and left awards at the court’s discretion. An Act to Limit Private Suits for Penalties and Damages § 1, 57 Stat at 609.
94 31 USC § 3730(b)(4)(B).
95 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(B).
96 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A).
97 31 USC § 3730(b)(3).
98 31 USC § 3730(c)(4).
99 31 USC § 3730(c)(3).
100 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(C).
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the court and Attorney General.101 The government may settle the
action with the defendant “notwithstanding the objections of the
person initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”102
However, when the government seeks dismissal, the Act’s
text is much more ambiguous and seemingly deferential: “The
Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court
has provided the person with the opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.”103 This provision is at the heart of this Comment. Parsing
the standard for government dismissal of a qui tam suit from this
relatively sparse text involves the interpretive, constitutional,
and incentives analysis performed in the following Parts.
B. The Legislative History Clarifies That Objecting Relators
Are Not Guaranteed a Hearing but Provides No Clear
Dismissal Standard
The legislative history on the topic of dismissal is sparse. This
Section argues that Congress clearly contemplated that relators
could challenge the government’s dismissal, but hearings would
only be provided for substantiated objections. Despite fleshing out
some of the hearing provision, the legislative history suggests no
clear standard of review for dismissal petitions.
The Senate Committee Report is the only source of legislative
history on the question of dismissal, and all courts that have considered the question refer to it. In its brief discussion of the dismissal provision, the Report reads:
Any objections filed by the qui tam plaintiff may be accompanied by a petition for an evidentiary hearing on those objections. The Committee does not intend, however, that evidentiary hearings be granted as a matter of right. We recognize
that an automatic right could provoke unnecessary litigation
delays. Rather, evidentiary hearings should be granted when
the qui tam relator shows a “substantial and particularized
need” for a hearing.104
101
102
103
104

31 USC § 3730(b)(1).
31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(B).
31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A).
S Rep 99-345 at 26 (cited in note 4).
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This Senate Committee Report reflects Congress’s unwillingness to give objecting relators even a hearing on the government’s
motion to dismiss without good reason. In contrast to the settlement provision’s requirement that the court must determine that
the agreement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the
circumstances,”105 the Report explains that only persuasive objections warrant a hearing.
Only when a relator shows a “substantial and particularized
need”106 should the court grant a hearing on the motion to dismiss.
Noticeably absent is what exactly a “substantial and particularized need” entails. Even more noticeable—in both the statute and
legislative history—is the total lack of a discussion of the standard of review. Unlike the other sections noted above, the dismissal provision offers no suggestion for how a court should go about
determining whether dismissal is unwarranted.
From the legislative history, it is at least clear that the relator is not guaranteed protection from—let alone a hearing on—
dismissal, but also that Congress did conceive of situations in
which a court could deny the government’s dismissal motion.
Given this ambiguity—that meaningful hearings are contemplated but only for serious objections—the current dismissal
standards of the Ninth and DC Circuits are on questionable footing. Without strong textual or historical support, these current
approaches lack a compelling justification. The following Part will
present and critique these two dominant standards before turning to the final Part in presenting the Executive Judgment Rule
as the superior approach.
III. SEQUOIA AND SWIFT: WHAT THEY ARE,
WHY THEY MATTER, AND HOW THEY FALL SHORT
Given the few relator suits initially brought following the
1986 Amendment, courts were not confronted with the question
of dismissal standards until some eleven years after the Amendment’s passage. In the late 1980s the number of qui tam suits was

105
106

31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(B).
S Rep 99-345 at 42 (cited in note 4).
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low, but it began to grow rapidly in the mid-1990s.107 Not coincidentally, the DOJ moved for dismissal of a relator’s claim for the
first time under the 1986 Amendment in Sequoia.108
The Ninth Circuit required the government to prove a “rational relation” between its interests and the dismissal it
sought.109 In practice, the Sequoia standard requires that the government justify dismissal by showing that valid government interests outweigh the potential benefits of pursuing the case.
Rejecting Sequoia, the DC Circuit in Swift v United States
interpreted the 1986 Amendment to grant the government an
“unfettered right” to dismiss.110 In practice, the Swift standard’s
burden of dismissal is simply that of filing a motion to dismiss.
Where Sequoia creates a presumption that the suit is valid and
requires the government to explain why it should be dismissed,
Swift creates an almost irrebuttable presumption that the government’s decision to dismiss is valid.
This Part will examine the reasoning behind each approach
before arguing that both fail to either fully embrace the text of the
Act or avoid constitutional concerns. Furthermore, as this Comment argues in Part IV.D, even if these judicially crafted standards perfectly interpreted the Act’s text, they still would fail to
address the central issue animating the DOJ and this Comment:
too many meritless suits are being brought. Demonstrating these
deficiencies lays the groundwork for the proposed solution—one
that best achieves the goals of the qui tam provision, avoids the
constitutional issues of both current approaches, and gives courts
a manageable approach to evaluating dismissals, while simultaneously creating an optimal incentive structure.
A. Sequoia
In 1988, the Sequoia Orange Company filed thirty-four qui
tam actions against a number of competing citrus growers for alleged violations of orange and lemon marketing orders set by the
Department of Agriculture.111 After intervening in ten of the
107

US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics at *1 (cited in note 3).
Interestingly, in the immediate aftermath of Sequoia, the number of relator suits
fell and did not exceed the 1995 high until 2010. Id at *1–2. Since 2011, the number of new
qui tam suits has often exceeded seven hundred. Id at *2.
109 Sequoia, 151 F3d at 1145.
110 Swift, 318 F3d at 252.
111 Sequoia, 151 F3d at 1141. In 1984, the Secretary of Agriculture had imposed restrictions on citrus shipments into California in order to stabilize prices and production.
Id at 1142.
108
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cases, the government discovered “evidence of widespread [ ] violations” of the marketing orders and concluded “that the [regulations] had become divisive.”112 As a result, the government proposed a complete settlement of FCA claims “in order to end
industry turmoil.”113 After securing consent to the settlement from
the defendants, the government intervened in the remaining
twenty-four suits to dismiss them.114
With no precedent for government dismissal under the 1986
Amendment, the District Court for the Eastern District of
California created a “rational relation” test to flesh out the FCA’s
ambiguous dismissal standard.115 Having decided that the government may dismiss if it can demonstrate a rational relationship
between dismissal and legitimate government interests, the court
held a four-day evidentiary hearing. The court ordered dismissal
of all of Sequoia’s suits after finding the government’s interest in
settling the disruptions to the citrus market was legitimate and
rationally related to dismissal.116 Sequoia appealed, contending
that dismissal is improper “unless the court found the cases
lacked merit.”117
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and rejected Sequoia’s proposed rule, concluding that “[t]he district court acted
reasonably in adopting [the rational relation test].”118 Because the
government carried its burden of meeting the test, the burden
then switched to Sequoia “to demonstrate that dismissal is fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious, or illegal.”119
The Ninth Circuit’s justification is brief—just two paragraphs and a block quote defend its adoption of the lower court’s
creation.120 The Ninth Circuit first notes that the 1986 Amendment’s text “does not create a particular standard for dismissal.”121 Given that the text was ambiguous, the court found the
district court’s approach to be a reasonable interpretation. The
rest of the opinion notes and quickly rejects the constitutional

112

Id.
Id.
114 Id.
115 Sequoia, 151 F3d at 1145.
116 United States ex rel Sequoia Orange Co v Sunland Packing House Co, 912 F Supp
1325, 1341, 1354 (ED Cal 1995).
117 Sequoia, 151 F3d at 1143.
118 Id at 1145.
119 Sunland Packing, 912 F Supp at 1347.
120 Sequoia, 151 F3d at 1145–46.
121 Id at 1145.
113
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concerns raised by this rational relation test. The court emphasized that “the district court has respected the Executive Branch’s
prosecutorial authority by requiring no greater justification of the
dismissal motion than is mandated by the Constitution itself,” because “due process prohibits arbitrary or irrational prosecutorial
decisions.”122 No further explanation is provided.
In the years following Sequoia, the Second123 and Tenth124 Circuits adopted the rational relation standard for dismissal, but neither expanded significantly upon the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.
Though the Seventh Circuit has not taken a position, its district
courts appear to favor Sequoia review.125
In addition to the Sequoia court’s explanation that due process prevents “arbitrary or irrational prosecutorial decisions,”126
there is a powerful argument that due process also requires at
least some level of judicial review before dismissal. This argument combines the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence
and its recent decision on the nature of the relator’s share.
As an initial matter, the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”127 In the landmark case Goldberg v Kelly,128 the
Court recognized that nondiscretionary interests, entitlements,
and benefits guaranteed by statute fall under the definition of
property for the purposes of due process analysis.129 However, the
fact that the relator has a property interest does not end the inquiry. As held in Mathews v Eldridge130, the level of process—that
is, the level of procedural protections one receives—is tied to the
extent and importance of the interest.131 Under this test, the court
122

Id at 1146.
See United States ex rel Stevens v Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F3d
195, 201 (2d Cir 1998), revd on other grounds, 529 US 765 (2000).
124 See Ridenour v Kaiser-Hill Co, LLC, 397 F3d 925, 936 (10th Cir 2005). Similar to
Stevens, Ridenour only required that the government’s reason be “plausible, or arguable”
for it to pass muster. Id at 937, quoting Sunland Packing, 912 F Supp at 1341.
125 See, for example, United States ex rel CIMZNHCA, LLC v UCB, Inc, 2019 WL
2409576, *1 (SD Ill); United States ex rel Nicholson v Spigelman, 2011 WL 2683161, *3
(ND Ill).
126 Sequoia, 151 F3d at 1146.
127 US Const Amend V.
128 397 US 254 (1970).
129 See id at 262 n 8. For the seminal proposal of this new conception of property under
the Fifth Amendment, see generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L J
733 (1964).
130 424 US 319 (1976).
131 In Eldridge, the Court held that statutorily created property rights—Social Security benefits in that case—implicated Fifth Amendment protections but did not warrant
123
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balances three considerations in determining the amount of due
process required for the government to deprive someone of a property interest. These considerations are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.132
This balancing determines the extent of procedural protections
required to lawfully deprive an individual of a property right.
Applying this caselaw and approach to qui tam relators entails two steps: first, showing that relators have a property interest; and second, considering the level of due process required to
protect this right. The text of the statute and a recent Supreme
Court decision make clear that relators have a property interest
in the suit.
Looking first at the text, the Act uses the mandatory “shall”
in its provision for relator awards.133 Unlike the 1943 version of
the FCA, relators are conceived of as equal coparties and guaranteed a percentage of the recovery. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v United States ex rel
Stevens134 ratified this understanding of the text in holding that
relators are “partial assignee[s]” of the government’s claims under the FCA.135 Noting that though the relator cannot meet Article III standing alone, the Court concluded:
We believe, however, that adequate basis for the relator’s suit
for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine that the assignee
of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered

the full extent of due process protections. The Court held that posttermination appeal options sufficiently protected the plaintiff’s interests, and that the interest was not substantial enough to justify the burden pretermination hearings would place on the government.
Id at 334–35.
132 Id at 336.
133 31 USC § 3730(d)(1).
134 529 US 765 (2000).
135 Id at 773 n 4.
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by the assignor. The FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages
claim.136
As a partial assignee, the relator can claim protection of the
Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee on the grounds that
dismissal is a deprivation of a property interest and, as such, requires a level of due process protection. The text of the amendment explicitly allows for unrestricted dismissal only where the
“the person bringing the action is convicted of criminal conduct
arising from his or her role in the violation of section 3729.”137
Even where the relator is the “person who planned and initiated
the violation,” the deprivation is at the discretion of the court.138
The Supreme Court’s due process caselaw, its conception of the
relator as partial assignee, and the Act’s own hesitation to deprive
a relator of their share clearly reject a standard that provides absolutely no protection. The actual extent of the due process protection will be explored at length in the following sections, but it
is enough to note now that some level of process is required.
B. Swift
In 1999, DOJ employee Susan Swift brought a qui tam action
against one current and two former coworkers at the Department’s Office of Legal Counsel.139 Swift alleged that the defendants violated the FCA by submitting fraudulent time sheets and
leave slips.140 The government sought dismissal, arguing (1) that
it had the right to dismiss any claim brought in its name, and
(2) that the costs of litigation well outweighed any recovery from
the suit. The District Court for the District of Columbia granted
the government’s motion to dismiss.141
In Swift v United States, the DC Circuit upheld the district
court, giving several related reasons why the government’s right
to dismiss is “unfettered.”142 First, the court examined the question through a separation of powers lens. It stated that as a constitutional baseline, the executive branch has the sole power to

136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id at 773.
31 USC § 3730(d)(3).
31 USC § 3730(d)(3).
Swift, 318 F3d at 250.
Id.
Id at 251.
Id at 252.
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execute and enforce the laws.143 Inherent in this power is the right
to bring and dismiss prosecutions without judicial oversight, except where the statute provides for judicial review.144 Looking to
the text for a clear statement of intent to override the separation
of powers baseline, the court argued that the words “[t]he government may dismiss”145 in the 1986 Amendment clearly refer to the
executive’s, and not the judiciary’s, right to dismiss, “which at
least suggests the absence of judicial constraint.”146 Looking to
precedent, the court cited Heckler v Chaney147 for the “presumption that decisions not to prosecute, which is what the government’s judgment in this case amounts to, are unreviewable.”148
This prosecutorial discretion argument is powerful, as the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the near plenary power
of the executive branch to bring and withhold suit in both the civil
and criminal contexts.149 Judicial review of a prosecutor’s decision
to bring or dismiss the government’s own case is only available
where the defendant can meet the high bar of showing selective
prosecution150 or exercise of prosecutorial discretion for “impermissible reasons.”151
Along these same lines, Swift rejects both the due process argument advanced in Sequoia (that the Fifth Amendment prevents
“arbitrary or irrational prosecutorial decisions”152) as well as the
argument advanced above (that relators have a protected property interest in their suits).153

143

Swift, 318 F3d at 252.
Id at 252–53.
145 Id at 251, quoting 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
146 Swift, 318 F3d at 252.
147 470 US 821 (1985). See also United States v Armstrong, 517 US 456, 465 (1996),
citing Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607 (1985) (“Such factors as the strength of the
case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities,
and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”).
148 Swift, 318 F3d at 252.
149 See, for example, Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US 497,
527 (2007); Armstrong, 517 US at 465; Wade v United States, 504 US 181, 186–87 (1992);
Wayte, 470 US at 612–14; Chaney, 470 US at 834–35, 838; Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US
357, 364 (1978); United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 693 (1974); Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171,
182 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 74 US 454, 457 (1868).
150 Armstrong, 517 US at 465 (“In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor
has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present ‘clear evidence to the
contrary.’”).
151 Chaney, 470 US at 847.
152 Sequoia, 151 F3d at 1146.
153 Swift, 318 F3d at 253.
144

1078

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1051

The Sequoia court held that the Constitution prohibited arbitrary or irrational prosecutorial decisions, and, as such, the government must justify its decision to dismiss a relator’s suit. The
Swift court flatly rejected this claim, reiterating that the justifications for bringing or withholding prosecution are committed to
the government’s “absolute discretion.”154 This argument is much
the same as the separation of powers argument, but instead of
turning on whether the statute provided for judicial review, this
argument focuses on whether the basic constitutional guarantees
of due process provide for judicial review. The court conceded that
even if the discretion is not absolute, at the very least the government is entitled to a presumption of rationality and good faith in
its prosecutorial decisions.155 Sequoia thus goes too far in flipping
this presumption by impermissibly requiring the government to
justify its decisions to seek dismissal.156
As for the other due process argument, the Swift court did
not meaningfully engage with the argument this Comment advances in favor of some level of judicial review based on the “partial assignee” relationship. The court said simply that although
the Supreme Court recognized relators as partial assignees of the
government’s claim, “[d]ismissal ends the assignment.”157 No further explanation was given. Thus, lacking any interpretive reason
to justify judicial review, highlighting the constitutional presumption of deference to prosecutorial discretion, and rejecting
the property interest–based due process argument, the court upheld the dismissal and adopted the “unfettered right” approach to
government dismissal of relators’ suits.158
The Fifth Circuit159 and the Eastern District of Kentucky160,
in cases considering the constitutionality of the qui tam provision,
154

Id.
Id.
156 Id.
157 Swift, 318 F3d at 254 n *.
158 Id.
159 See Riley v St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 252 F3d 749, 758 (5th Cir 2001) (en banc)
(addressing the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provision, and noting that the government has the “unilateral power to dismiss an action notwithstanding the objections of
the person”) (quotation marks omitted). See also United States v Delta Regional Medical
Center, 2019 WL 1305069, *5 (ND Miss) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit has all but explicitly stated
that the government’s decision to dismiss a qui tam false claim case is its choice alone.”).
160 See United States v Ball Homes, LLC, 2018 WL 3213614, *4 (ED Ky), citing United
States ex rel Levine v Avnet, Inc, 2015 WL 1499519 (ED Ky):
155

Although § 3730(c)(2)(A) entitles him to ‘a hearing’ on the government’s motion
to dismiss, if he requests one, there is no requirement that he be permitted to
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offer an additional argument in favor of Swift. They argue that
the dismissal stage is the first real opportunity for the government to decide if it wants to bring the case, as the relator brings
the suit in the government’s name without having to obtain its
consent first. Therefore, because the decision to dismiss is tantamount to the executive branch’s decision not to prosecute, “the
Court should give it the same deference.”161 Not permitting the
government to dismiss here “usurps” the executive branch’s prosecutorial discretion in the same way as if a court forced the executive to bring charges.162
C. The Choice of Dismissal Standard Is Outcome
Determinative
Deciding which dismissal standard to apply is not simply a
matter of interpretive and constitutional hairsplitting. Rather,
this decision has real stakes for both relators and the executive
branch. When a court applies Sequoia, the government must justify its decision and give both the court and the relator its policy
goals and interests. When a court applies Swift, the relator is provided no protection from dismissal except in cases of outright
fraud on the court. The solution to these approaches’ shortcomings is not to simply employ both, as such an approach does not
in any way address the root problems. Applying both would still
mean either having the decision turn on the heightened Sequoia
or the plenary Swift dismissal standard.
The choice of dismissal standard is crucial, as this decision is
often outcome determinative.163 Though there are currently no
systematic studies of how often dismissal is denied, one of the few
studies analyzing available data suggests a nonnegligible number
of dismissal motions is rejected each year.164 Additionally, the fact
that the Granston Memo instructs attorneys to invoke the Swift
standard in seeking dismissal suggests that the DOJ sees a meaningful difference in outcomes between the standards and, thus,

introduce evidence. This Court has concluded that the government has virtually
unfettered discretion to dismiss a False Claims Act case, save exceptional circumstances, such as a showing of fraud on the Court.
161

Delta Regional Medical Center, 2019 WL 1305069 at *6.
Id.
163 See, for example, United States v Academy Mortgage Corp, 2018 WL 3208157, *3
(ND Cal) (applying Sequoia and denying dismissal); CIMZNHCA, 2019 WL 2409576 at *2
(same).
164 Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1715–18 (cited in note 20).
162
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that dismissal is presumably less likely in Sequoia jurisdictions.
This difference in outcomes is significant for both parties. When
Swift is applied instead of Sequoia and the government’s motion
is granted, a possibly meritorious relator is left with almost no
recourse. When Sequoia is applied instead of Swift and the government’s motion to dismiss is not granted, the government is
forced to permit an unwanted suit to continue in its name.
The cost to the government of a higher bar to dismissal is not
insignificant. On the front end, such a standard requires greater
investigation and work to dismiss meritless cases. This difference
means millions of dollars and thousands of DOJ man-hours. For
example, in a single health care qui tam case, the government
recounted: “To date, the United States has had to devote considerable resources to this declined case. HHS-OGC has dedicated at
least two attorneys, one almost full-time, and the Department of
Justice has dedicated up to four attorneys to this case.”165
On the back end, after their motion to dismiss is denied, the
government will at least closely monitor the case developments,
if not seek dismissal again, intervene to control the course of the
suit, or seek settlement with the defendant.166 One of the most
notable expenses in dismissal-denied cases is the advancement to
discovery and trial where government agents may be subjected to
deposition and testimony for a case the government has already
disclaimed interest in.167 One dismissal motion states:

165 Memorandum of Law in Support of the United States’ Motion to Dismiss Relator’s
Third Amended Complaint, United States ex rel Polansky v Executive Health Resources,
Inc, No 12-cv-04239-MMB, *10 (ED Pa filed Aug 20, 2019) (Polansky Motion to Dismiss).
166 Though exact statistics of resources and hours spent monitoring such cases is unavailable, the government’s motion to dismiss in a 2019 case is representative. The government argued that

[r]elators’ continued pursuit of the matter will necessarily entail the further expenditure of the government’s resources. As is evident from the government’s
participation to date, the United States has actively monitored Relators’ litigation. In particular, the government has found it necessary on multiple occasions
to file briefs to set forth the United States’ views on the interpretation and application of the FCA to the legal theories alleged by Relators and the challenges
to it presented by defendants.
United States’ Motion to Dismiss Relators’ Second Amended Complaint; [Proposed] Order,
United States ex rel Campie v Gilead Sciences, Inc, No 11-cv-00941-EMC, *9 (ND Cal filed
Mar 28, 2019) (available on Westlaw at 2019 WL 1583123).
167 Id (“Absent dismissal, the litigation will likely proceed to discovery, requiring the
United States to commit even more significant resources. . . . [T]he same FDA and CMS
employees relevant to discovery would be potential witnesses at any trial. This would divert those employees from their other duties and agency priorities.”).
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If this litigation were to go forward, the United States would
also need to continue devoting considerable resources to monitoring the case to ensure that the United States’ interests
are protected and not harmed by the ongoing litigation. Two
Civil Division attorneys and two Assistant U.S. Attorneys
have been assigned to this matter, and all four have devoted
a considerable amount of time to this case at the expense of
other important matters.168
The costs of just monitoring are significant, let alone the costs
of being forced to participate in the suit. Whether it is DOJ lawyers or agency personnel, the impositions of a declined dismissal
make the differences in outcome of more than just academic
interest.
Additionally, a heightened dismissal standard results in
fewer dismissals, which leads to more complaints and a greater
number of those complaints being unsealed. Each unsealed complaint results in huge defense costs for regulated entities—even
where the case is ultimately dismissed.169 For one defendant, successfully rejecting the relator’s claims required “eighteen years of
litigation before three district judges and two magistrate judges,
including massive discovery.”170 Lastly, in placing the burden to
show rational relation on the government, even when the case is
successfully dismissed, Sequoia ignores the legislative history’s
rejection of an “automatic right” to a hearing.171
On the other hand, when Swift is selected over Sequoia, relators are stripped of a property interest recognized by the Supreme
Court without much of a meaningful opportunity to object. Furthermore, serious relators are discouraged from bringing suit as

168

Polansky Motion to Dismiss at *20 (cited in note 165).
William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in
Government Procurement Markets, 6 S Ct Econ Rev 201, 225 (1998) (“[C]ontractors incur
out-of-pocket legal costs of at least $250,000 to $500,000 whenever . . . a qui tam relator
has filed a suit.”); Pamela Bucy, et al, States, Statutes, and Fraud: A Study of Emerging
State Efforts to Combat White Collar Crime, 31 Cardozo L Rev 1523, 1533 (2010) (“When
a fraud investigation becomes public, business expansions, corporate borrowing, and mergers and acquisitions may be put on hold or lost as opportunities.”); Todd J. Canni, Who’s
Making False Claims, The Qui Tam Plaintiff or the Government Contractor? A Proposal to
Amend the FCA to Require That All Qui Tam Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 Pub
Contract L J 1, 12 (2007) (“These huge costs may ultimately put the contractor out of
business.”).
170 Brief of the American Hospital Association and Federation of American Hospitals
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Intermountain Health Care, Inc v United States
ex rel Polukoff, No 18-911, *21 (US filed Feb 13, 2019).
171 S Rep 99-345 at 26 (cited in note 4).
169
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they know they have no protections from summary dismissal or
the possible employment consequences of failed whistleblowing.
In denying relators any meaningful right to object to the proceedings, Swift ignores the legislative history’s provision for evidentiary hearings when “substantial and particularized need” is
shown.172 In either direction, the difference in decisional rules
matters for the government and relators as parties and for the
incentive structure of the qui tam provision.
D. The Current Approaches’ Interpretive and Constitutional
Shortcomings
To lay the grounds for the proposed solution, this Comment
will examine the failures of both current approaches to fully embrace the text and articulated purpose of the statute as well as
the significant constitutional concerns they raise.
1. Both approaches fail to reflect the 1986
Amendment’s text.
Both Swift and Sequoia fail to fully comport with the FCA’s
text. The plain text of the 1986 Amendment requires that the “Attorney General diligently shall investigate a violation under section 3729”173 and that the court provide a relator “with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion” to dismiss.174 Swift leaves both
textual requirements unfulfilled.
First, the “unfettered right” approach of Swift jurisdictions
directly conflicts with the Attorney General’s duty to “diligently
[ ] investigate.”175 Under Swift, the government only needs to receive the complaint before dismissing it, even when the relator
can show the existence of a “manifest public interest” in investigating the case.176 Such discretion renders the “hearing” requirement a nullity. The superfluidity canon counsels against such interpretations that ignore the duly passed and enacted words of
Congress.177

172

Id at 42.
31 USC § 3730(a).
174 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A).
175 31 USC § 3730(a).
176 Hoyte v American National Red Cross, 518 F3d 61, 65 (DC Cir 2008).
177 See Hibbs v Winn, 542 US 88, 101 (2004), quoting Norman Singer, 2A Sutherland,
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 at 181–86 (West rev 6th ed 2000) (“A statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”); Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 146
173
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Second, the statute repeatedly confirms that relators are
coparties, not simply tipsters. Entitled “Rights of the parties to
qui tam actions,” § 3730(c) covers both the government’s dismissal and settlement powers as well as the right of relators “to
continue as a party to the action” after government intervention.
Section 3730(c)(2)(C) further indicates that the relators are fullfledged parties in the suit. The section allows the government to
reduce, at the court’s discretion, the participation of a relator in a
suit only when it shows a clear need on the government’s or defendant’s part. Just as the court recognized relators as partial assignees, the text of the statute empowers courts to protect that
partial interest of relators. The total abdication of this role by
courts adopting Swift conflicts with the text.
Lastly, § 3730(b)(1) requires written consent “and their reasons for consenting” from both the Attorney General and the court
in order for a relator to dismiss their suit. If the Attorney General
had plenary power to dismiss the suit, it is unclear why Congress
would insert a written consent requirement. This provision
clearly recognizes a role for courts in the proceedings—one Swift
ignores.
On the other hand, Sequoia goes too far in the other direction
by reading in a stricter standard of review than the text can support. All other provisions permitting government action or petition in the 1986 Amendment provide standards such as “good
cause,”178 “fair, adequate, and reasonable,”179 or “[u]pon a showing.”180 Only the government’s request to be served with copies of
pleadings181 and the dismissal provision182 furnish no clear standard of judicial review. The canon of expressio unius183 provides a
robust presumption that Congress meant something when it did
not include such standards in the dismissal provision. The only
textual guide in the FCA is “diligently [ ] investigate.”184 There is
no reason to interpret those two words to permit the probing, substantive review that Sequoia courts perform as a first resort in
dismissal hearings. Furthermore, given the negative inferences
(1995) (“We assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have
a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”).
178 31 USC § 3730(b)(3).
179 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(B).
180 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(D).
181 31 USC § 3730(c)(3).
182 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A).
183 See, for example, Tate v Ogg, 195 SE 496, 499–500 (Va 1938).
184 31 USC § 3730(a).
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drawn from the fact that only the dismissal provision lacks a
standard for review, such an interpretation would be contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute. As argued below, the minimum
requirements of due process do not rescue Sequoia’s overreach
either.
2. The 1986 Amendment’s legislative history supports
neither approach.
The 1986 Amendment’s legislative history185 further highlights Sequoia’s and Swift’s interpretive deficiencies. The legislative history cuts against both current standards.
Beginning with Swift, the court’s “unfettered right” approach
ignores one of Congress’s central reasons for passing the amendment: to make combatting fraud “a coordinated effort of both the
Government and the citizenry.”186 The 1986 Amendment’s drafters recognized the need for increased incentives and protections
for relators to encourage potential relators to bring and pursue
their suits vigorously.187 Specifically, the legislative history reflects the 1986 Amendment’s drafters’ belief that its provisions
would enable relators to “act[ ] as a check” against the government “neglect[ing] evidence” or otherwise mishandling the case.188
The Swift standard undermines the tool of qui tam suits—a
tool Congress intentionally resuscitated in 1986—by reading out
relator protections. Swift jurisdictions seemingly provide no recourse for dismissed relators.189 Importantly, a dismissed suit carries none of the Act’s protections from employer retaliation or termination that a successful relator is entitled to. The majority of
relators are one-off plaintiffs190 who “come forward despite the
risk to their careers”—an act that “takes courage,” as DOJ press
releases frequently emphasize.191 Swift disincentivizes relators
from bringing suit by creating a cloud of doubt that the
government will summarily dismiss, ignoring the Senate Report’s

185 See Part II.B. The only legislative history dealing with the dismissal standard,
and the one used by every court to consider the issue, is the Senate Committee Report.
186 S Rep 99-345 at 2 (emphasis added) (cited in note 4).
187 Id at 4.
188 Id at 26.
189 Swift, 318 F3d at 253. See also Ball Homes, 2018 WL 3213614 at *4.
190 Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1289 (cited in note 20).
191 US Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers
Over $4.7 Billion (cited in note 66).
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specific declaration that the purpose of the qui tam revisions is to
remedy this “great unwillingness to expose illegalities.”192
Just as Swift ignores the text of the Act and the protections
it provides relators, Sequoia overreads the Act’s procedural protections. As discussed above, a main purpose of the Act was to
incentivize relators in a number of ways—one of those being enhanced procedural protections. However, the legislative history
was not silent about the nature of those protections from dismissal. The Senate Report states that “[t]he Committee does not intend, however, that evidentiary hearings be granted as a matter
of right.”193 Rather, a hearing is only “granted when the qui tam
relator shows a ‘substantial and particularized need’ for a hearing.”194 The legislative history is clear that there is no intent for
an objection to result in the government automatically being forced
to prove anything, let alone being forced in every dismissal motion
to meet a judicially created rational relation test based neither in
the history nor text of the 1986 Amendment. While Sequoia puts
the burden of defending its substantive decision on the government in every dismissal, the legislative history imagines such investigations will occur only after the relator shows a “substantial
and particularized need” for a hearing. There is no evidence in
either the text or legislative history that supports such a constant
and probing role for courts to review motions to dismiss. Furthermore, neither approach is saved from their interpretive problems,
let alone even supported, by constitutional analysis.
3. The canon of constitutional avoidance counsels adopting
an alternative interpretation.
Even if the standards fully embraced the text and history of
the 1986 Amendment, they would still have to comport with the
Constitution. In examining their constitutionality, the canon of
constitutional avoidance195 is instructive as both Swift and
Sequoia raise serious constitutional concerns. As such, a court

192

S Rep 99-345 at 4 (cited in note 4).
Id at 26.
194 Id (emphasis omitted).
195 See, for example, United States v Delaware and Hudson Co, 213 US 366, 408
(1909) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”).
193
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should choose an interpretation of the FCA not raising such concerns so long as the statute is “reasonably susceptible” to such
interpretation.196
Swift jurisdictions have yet to satisfactorily explain why “unfettered” dismissal of a relator’s partial interest without a meaningful opportunity to object does not violate the minimum requirements of due process. While Swift is correct to note that the
presumption is that “the Executive is acting rationally and in
good faith,”197 this does not, even in the context of prosecutorial
discretion, totally insulate government dismissal from judicial review.198 Even under the limiting principles of Eldridge, statutory
entitlements require some amount of due process protection. In
determining the “specific dictates” of the due process required,
courts balance the individual’s interest being deprived, the risk of
erroneous deprivation under the current procedures as well as the
efficacy of possible additional safeguards, and the costs and burdens additional procedural safeguards would place on the government.199 Here, much like in Eldridge, relators have a statutorily
created interest in a portion of the total recovery. However, unlike
Eldridge’s posttermination hearing guarantee, Swift forces a relator to seek costly appellate review that is unlikely to safeguard
the interest. Furthermore, the cost and burden to the government
of instituting additional procedures is not clearly high enough to
justify the current balance struck by Swift courts. Crafted to accommodate the age of statutory rights and entitlements, Eldridge
does not stand for the proposition that any burden on the government justifies a total lack of process for interest holders. An opportunity to simply object without any requirement that the government respond is not likely the remedy this canon of
construction calls for.
While Swift arguably denies relators their right to due process, Sequoia arguably unconstitutionally burdens the government’s execution of the laws and prosecutorial discretion by permitting probing review under the guise of the constitutional
minimum of due process. Prosecutorial discretion is incompatible
with an approach requiring the government to satisfactorily justify dismissal every time a relator would prefer to proceed.200
196
197
198
199
200

Id at 407.
Swift, 318 F3d at 253.
See United States v Batchelder, 442 US 114, 124–25 (1979).
Eldridge, 424 US at 335.
See Chaney, 470 US at 821.
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When the “statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow
in exercising its enforcement powers,” the presumption of unreviewability may be rebutted, but only insofar as the court is evaluating the executive exercise of the statutory authority against
the guidelines in that statute.201
Though “diligently [ ] investigate”202 offers some standard
against which to review the government’s investigation, there is
no compelling reason to read it as offering anything more. Under
the Supreme Court’s prosecutorial discretion caselaw, a court is
empowered to review agency action against the text of the statute
conferring the power to act.203 Thus, a court is arguably on solid
ground, under the holding of Chaney, to use the statutory guideline of diligent investigation as the standard against which to
judge the DOJ’s investigation of the complaint. However, this
phrase furnishes no clear basis for Sequoia jurisdictions’ requirement that the government provide and justify its cost-benefit
analysis every time the relator objects to dismissal. Diligent investigation, the only relevant statutory guideline, concerns the
process of the investigation, not the agency’s balancing of enforcement priorities, resource constraints, regulatory strategy, and
other complex factors.
Both approaches fail to embrace the text or history of the
1986 Amendment while raising significant constitutional concerns. Furthermore, neither successfully balances the incentives
of the qui tam provision in both encouraging meritorious suits
and discouraging meritless ones. Addressed fully in Part IV.D,
Swift underprotects relators and thereby discourages those with
knowledge of fraud from bringing suit, while Sequoia overprotects
and thereby encourages meritless suits. As such, even if either
approach better reflected the text of the Act and avoided constitutional problems, they would still fall short. The proposed solution not only lacks the interpretive and constitutional defects of
Sequoia and Swift, but also incentivizes serious relators to bring
suit while disincentivizing frivolous suits.

201
202
203

Id at 833.
31 USC § 3730(a).
Chaney, 470 US at 833.
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IV. THE EXECUTIVE JUDGMENT RULE: HOW CORPORATE LAW
BALANCES THE TEXTUAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND INCENTIVE
CONSIDERATIONS
This Part argues that by adapting the business judgment rule
to the FCA context, courts can embrace the text of the 1986
Amendment and remedy the proliferation of meritless qui tam
suits. Given the similarities between the qui tam and shareholder
derivative suit contexts, corporate law provides a satisfying solution because it strikes the optimal balance of incentives and protections. Much like the DOJ, a Special Litigation Committee is
presented with a filed complaint and tasked with acting in the
corporation’s best interest. While the shareholder/relator is putatively suing on behalf of the corporation/government, their real
interest is naturally self-interest. Thus, the question is the same
in both contexts: How do we harness this self-interest for the corporation’s/United States’ benefit without also encouraging frivolous, costly suits? To do so, corporate law employs the business
judgment rule. While the analogy is not perfect, the mismatches
between the shareholder and relator contexts actually support
importing this solution. Chiefly, unlike SLCs, we can justifiably
assume the DOJ works in the public interest and without selfserving concerns. Secondly, unlike shareholders, relators receive
sizeable rewards and have easier filing requirements. Thus, with
the DOJ as the perfect SLC and relators as the most litigious
shareholders, the business judgment rule’s presumption of informed decision-making and focus on procedural concerns perfectly suits the qui tam context. While Swift discourages meritorious suits and Sequoia encourages meritless suits, this
Comment’s proposed Executive Judgment Rule strikes the optimal balance of protecting only those relators with viable claims.
This Part proceeds in five sections. To lay the foundation for
the Executive Judgment Rule, Part IV.A provides necessary background on shareholder derivative suits, SLCs, and the Auerbach
standard. Part IV.B describes the Executive Judgment Rule and
analogizes the circumstances and procedural aspects of shareholder derivative suits and qui tam actions. Part IV.C argues that
the proposed solution best embraces the text and history of the
1986 Amendment while avoiding the constitutional issues of the
current approaches. Part IV.D examines literature on the incentive structures of whistleblower statutes to argue that not only
would the proposed solution better serve the government and
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public by filtering out lower-quality tips but would also serve serious relators by guaranteeing a basic level of government review.
Lastly, Part IV.E examines the solution in practice.
A. Shareholder Derivative Suits, Special Litigation
Committees, and the Auerbach Standard
Though dealing with shareholders rather than relators, corporate law has grappled extensively with how to strike the optimal incentive balance between drawing out strong claims and
minimizing the number of costly, frivolous suits. In doing so, a
number of states have taken different approaches. This Comment
does not seek to present them all in full detail. Rather, this Section will lay out the basic contours of shareholder derivative suits
to explain where the business judgment rule came from and how
it has been applied. Specifically, for reasons discussed later in this
Section, the Executive Judgment Rule adopts the more deferential approach of New York State and the dozen or so other jurisdictions following Auerbach. Before examining the specifics of
Auerbach, a brief primer on shareholder derivative suits and
SLCs is necessary.
A shareholder derivative suit is an action taken by a shareholder seeking to “enforce a corporation’s rights where its directors refuse to seek a remedy for an alleged harm to the corporation.”204 A shareholder alleging such a refusal has two options.
First, the shareholder can serve a demand letter on the corporation’s board. By doing so, the shareholder is implicitly conceding
that the majority of the board is independent and able to fairly
review the complaint.205 In this first situation, all courts apply the
business judgment rule and, with the exception of “extraordinary
cases,”206 the board’s decision regarding the letter is affirmed.207
As such, the majority of shareholders take the second option:
purporting to bring the litigation on behalf of the corporation and
alleging that the demand requirement is excused as futile.208 To
204 Judson R. Scaggs Jr and Angela C. Whitesell, Derivative Lawsuits, Part II.A
(Bloomberg BNA, 2014), online at https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/4305287208
(visited Apr 21, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable).
205 Scott Hirst, Special Litigation Committees in Shareholder Derivative Litigation
(Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, Apr 25, 2010), archived at
https://perma.cc/G596-GX2S.
206 Id, citing Kamen v Kemper Financial Services, Inc, 908 F2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir
1990), revd on other grounds, 500 US 90 (1991).
207 Hirst, Special Litigation Committees (cited in note 205).
208 Id.
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excuse the demand requirement, the shareholder must show particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt that a majority of
the board could impartially consider the complaint.209 If the shareholder successfully alleges board partiality, the shareholder
brings the suit on behalf of the corporation,210 but the board has
another avenue for reasserting the corporation’s control over the
suit: the SLC.211
Once suit is filed, the corporation may elect to form an SLC,
which is comprised of those members of the board or other appointees not involved in the alleged mismanagement, violation, or action at issue.212 SLCs enable a board to reassert control over the
suit in cases in which the shareholder has successfully alleged
demand futility.213 These SLCs are independent from the board
and retain final decisional authority over the shareholder’s suit.214
Assuming the SLC’s decision passes judicial review, this tool enables a corporation to dismiss the shareholder’s suit.215
State courts afford varying levels of deference to the SLCs’
decisions to dismiss derivative suits. The deference accorded to
SLCs turns on whether the court applies the business judgment
rule—essentially the presumption that the board or SLC members are disinterested, informed, and acting in good faith, and,
thus, that the court will not second-guess the board’s or SLC’s
motion.216 The majority, and least deferential, approach is that of
Delaware, as set out in Zapata Corp v Maldonado.217 Under Zapata,
the corporation must prove that the formation, composition, and
work of the SLC were at all times independent, undertaken in
good faith, and reasonable.218 If the corporation cannot show that
the SLC was independent, then the court “appl[ies] its own independent business judgment, whether [dismissal] should be

209 Id. This is the approach in Delaware and New York. See Del Chanc Court R 23.1
and NY Bus Corp L § 626.
210 Hirst, Special Litigation Committees (cited in note 205).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Scaggs and Whitesell, Derivative Lawsuits, Part VII.A (cited in note 204).
214 Id.
215 Hirst, Special Litigation Committees (cited in note 205).
216 The business judgment rule recognizes that courts struggle to make substantive
determinations about the propriety of business decisions and therefore gives deference to
a board’s unconflicted business judgments.
217 430 A2d 779 (Del 1981).
218 Id at 787. See also Hirst, Special Litigation Committees (cited in note 205).
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granted.”219 Even if the corporation does establish the SLC’s independence, dismissal is not guaranteed as the court still “may proceed, in its discretion” to its own independent review of whether
dismissal is in the corporation’s best interest.220 Under Zapata,
the business judgment rule’s protection is not guaranteed. Rather, courts are empowered, even where the SLC passes procedural muster, to wade into the fact-intensive, values-balancing
quagmire of deciding whether the suit best serves the corporation’s interests.
This lack of deference comes out of Delaware’s anxiety over
whether SLCs actually resolve the alleged partiality of the
board.221 This is not without basis as many academics share the
concern over SLCs.222 Delaware’s suspicion of SLCs leads its
courts to decide whether the facts justify dismissal and, in doing
so, to make their own judgments as to the best interest of the corporation223—a substantive call that courts are poorly positioned to
make.224 The varying strength of this anxiety over the good faith
and independence of SLCs helps fuel the difference in standards
across jurisdictions.
Unlike Delaware, New York and the jurisdictions following
its lead accord SLCs greater deference. Rejecting Zapata, New
York held in Auerbach v Bennett, that courts cannot attempt to
apply their own business judgment; rather, they may only review

219
220
221

Zapata, 430 A2d at 789.
Id.
Id at 787:

[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors in
the same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them
to serve both as directors and committee members. The question naturally arises
whether a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ empathy might not play a role.
Such concerns of director fraternity assumedly do not exist when the DOJ determines
whether to sue a fraudulent contractor.
222 See, for example, C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, and Randall S.
Thomas, How Do Legal Standards Matter? An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No 17-56, Nov 29, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/84UF-MQ2M (finding that the greater deference to the SLC, the more
likely the SLC is to seek dismissal); Kenneth B. Davis Jr, Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 Iowa L Rev 1305, 1306–09
(2005). Not all jurisdictions outside of Auerbach consider the SLC as suspect. Rejecting
Delaware’s scrutiny of SLCs, the ABA’s Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) favors
Auerbach, prompting commentators to note that the MBCA “entrusts courts with the least
latitude possible” in questioning the SLC’s decision. Meg Shevach, Comment, Deciding
Who Should Decide to Dismiss Derivative Suits, 39 Emory L J 937, 956 (1990).
223 Zapata, 430 A2d at 788.
224 Auerbach, 393 NE2d at 999–1000.

1092

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1051

SLCs for independence and for the “sufficiency of the investigative procedures chosen and pursued.”225 So long as the procedure
by which the SLC was formed and operated is untainted, New
York courts will grant the SLC’s motion to dismiss.226
The Auerbach approach, which continues to gain converts
even after four decades,227 limits judicial scrutiny to the procedure
of the SLC.228 So long as the SLC’s procedure is not grossly negligent, its decision is accorded business judgment rule deference.
Only where the shareholder provides a substantiated basis to
question the “disinterested independence of the members of that
committee” or “appropriateness and sufficiency of the investigative procedures chosen and pursued,” is the business judgment
rule presumption rebutted and may the court then review the
“substantive aspects” of the SLC’s decision to terminate the
suit.229 In examining the SLC’s investigation, the court relies on
its expertise as an investigative body itself. The court looks to the
“adequacy and appropriateness of the committee’s investigative
procedures and methodologies.”230 If the court finds the methods
flawed such that the SLC did not properly inform itself, or if the
SLC’s investigation was restricted in scope or execution or performed so halfheartedly as to “constitute a pretext or sham,” then
the business judgment rule is peeled back.231
The New York Court of Appeals created this approach because it recognized how difficult and imprecise it is to review corporate decisions. In applying its own “oxymoronic judicial ‘business judgment,’” 232 in the words of then–Vice Chancellor Leo
Strine, a court following Zapata is forced to evaluate a litany of
fact-intensive considerations in determining whether the decision
225
226

Id at 996.
See id:

[T]he substantive aspects of a decision to terminate a shareholders’ derivative
action against defendant corporate directors made by a committee of disinterested directors appointed by the corporation’s board of directors are beyond judicial inquiry under the business judgment doctrine, the court may inquire as to
the disinterested independence of the members of that committee and as to the
appropriateness and sufficiency of the investigative procedures chosen and pursued by the committee.
227 See, for example, In re Dish Network Derivative Litigation, 401 P3d 1081, 1085
(Nev 2017).
228 See Auerbach, 393 NE2d at 996.
229 Id.
230 Id at 1002.
231 Id at 1003.
232 In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation, 824 A2d 917, 928 (Del Chanc 2003).
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was reasonable at the time. The general unsuitability of business
decisions for judicial review explains the business judgment rule’s
existence and, more specifically, New York’s preference for evaluating process rather than substance in reviewing SLC decisions.
As described in Auerbach:
[T]he business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is
grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill
equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and
must be essentially business judgments. The authority and
responsibilities vested in corporate directors both by statute
and decisional law proceed on the assumption that inescapably there can be no available objective standard by which the
correctness of every corporate decision may be measured, by
the courts or otherwise.233
The especially fraught circumstances of shareholder derivative litigation—in which the SLC must decide, for example,
whether to hold a director or officer liable for conduct—compounds this difficulty. As such, Auerbach turns to ensuring the
process and independence of the SLC and leaves the difficult
weighing of factors and priorities to those most knowledgeable:
the SLC members.234 This is not to say the Supreme Court of
Delaware’s anxiety over SLCs is unfounded, but for the purposes
of this analogy to executive investigation and dismissal of qui tam
relator suits, Auerbach offers the more sensible standard.
The DOJ and executive assumedly do not raise the worries of
self-dealing and self-serving behavior that critics allege of SLCs—
because derivative suits are brought against their fellow board
members and the corporation. Government attorneys are not being asked to determine whether one of their coworkers should be
subjected to liability, as directors on SLCs are; rather, they are
determining whether to seek recovery for fraud committed by a
contractor. There is no compelling reason to apply Delaware’s
nondeferential approach to SLC decisions to the qui tam context.

233 Auerbach, 393 NE2d at 1000. See also Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of
the Business Judgment Rule, 14 NYU J L & Bus 27, 30 (2017) (“[W]ithout the Rule, the
raw power of equity . . . could conceivably require all challenged Board decisions to undergo an entire fairness review.”).
234 For an example of this analysis, Auerbach held that the SLC’s process was sufficient because, among other actions, the SLC “promptly engaged eminent special counsel,”
reviewed all work of the audit committee and tested their reports for “completeness, accuracy and thoroughness,” and interviewed all those who were “in any way” related to the
alleged issue. Auerbach, 393 NE2d at 1003.
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Rather, Auerbach’s approach of providing full deference so long
as the SLC follows reasonable investigative procedures is much
more appropriate to the situation of the DOJ. Because courts can
presume that the DOJ is independent and impartial, Zapata does
not offer a useful guide for evaluating dismissal decisions. Just as
corporate governance decisions are difficult balancing questions,
decisions to dismiss qui tam suits involve difficult cost-benefit
analyses and regulatory priority decisions. As such, where sufficient procedure merits the business judgment rule in Auerbach
jurisdictions, sufficient procedure should merit the Executive
Judgment Rule in DOJ decisions to dismiss relators’ claims.
B. Applying the Wisdom of Corporate Law: The Executive
Judgment Rule
This Section proceeds in two parts. First, it explains how the
Executive Judgment Rule would model the Auerbach approach
and utilize the language of the 1986 Amendment as a guide for
judicial review. Second, having set out the Rule, this Section argues that the similarities in goals and context between shareholder and relator suits offer strong support for adapting the successes of corporate law to FCA suits. This Section will argue that
beyond the clear analogy between the two fields, interpretive,
constitutional, and incentive analysis all counsel in favor of the
Executive Judgment Rule.
1. How the Executive Judgment Rule would work.
Applying the Auerbach approach to the qui tam context
would be relatively simple. First, courts should treat the relator
as a shareholder. Second, courts should treat the government as
an SLC. Third, if the relator challenges the government’s dismissal (by seeking a hearing), courts should only allow the relator to
substantively challenge alleged procedural defects in the DOJ’s
investigative process.235 Relators may only attack the process
by which this decision was made (for example, insufficient scope,
duration, and effort of the investigation) and not the substantive,
policy-based determinations of the government (for example,
235 An investigation restricted in scope or execution or performed so halfheartedly as
to “constitute a pretext or sham . . . would raise questions of good faith or conceivably fraud
which would never be shielded by that doctrine.” Id. But, “[w]hile the court may properly
inquire as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee’s investigative procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration of such factors trespass in the domain of business judgment.” Id at 1002.
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cost-benefit analysis, need for gatekeeping, and merit
determinations).
Under the Executive Judgment Rule, courts would give
meaning to the 1986 Amendment’s requirement that the “Attorney General diligently shall investigate.”236 This statutory language would be the touchstone for all review of the procedure by
which the government investigated the case. Only when a relator
shows procedural defects should a court require the government
to explain its decision to dismiss on substantive grounds. Using
the statutory lodestar of “diligently [ ] investigate,” courts
would scrutinize any procedural defects in the government’s
investigation.
For example, the relator could rebut the presumption favoring deference to the government by evidencing the failure of the
government to review documents submitted by the relator, interview witnesses named in the complaint, or otherwise not diligently investigate the matter. Although relators do not have access to the government’s substantive reasoning, they are well
positioned to know whether the information, witnesses, and directions for investigation they provided are being reviewed and
pursued. As the majority of qui tam suits are whistleblower suits,
the relator is often the sole possessor of the relevant knowledge
and means of divulging the fraud. For instance, in United States
v Academy Mortgage Corp,237 the relator brought a claim over
fraudulent mortgage certifications.238 The relator knew which witnesses to question and whether they had been questioned, and
repeatedly tried to provide the government with evidence about
the fraudulent certifications.239 Given the highly technical and
complex nature of many FCA violations, the government relies on
the relator,240 and this reliance allows relators to see if the government has actually examined the material, witness, and relator
information.
2. The shareholder derivative suit context analogizes well
to the qui tam relator context.
Before examining the interpretive, constitutional, and incentive rationales for the Executive Judgment Rule, it is useful to
236
237
238
239
240

31 USC § 3730(a).
2018 WL 3208157 (ND Cal).
Id at *1.
Id at *2.
S Rep 99-345 at 4 (cited in note 4). See also Part I.B.
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further discuss why analogizing to this corporate approach makes
sense. First, shareholders and relators are both, in theory, suing
to promote good (corporate) governance. While the qui tam relator
is more directly incentivized by the promise of a reward, in general the positions are quite analogous as both have a limited, but
actual, interest in the suit. Just like qui tam relators, shareholders in derivative suits seek redress on behalf of the corporation
for an injury felt primarily by the corporation and only incidentally by the shareholder. Both are afforded rights by their part
ownership/membership in the constituent body. And, crucially for
this analogy, both also require careful incentive-regime building.
SLCs and the DOJ are also similarly situated. Both are
charged with investigating claims impartially and “diligently”241
and rendering a decision on the best path forward in the corporation’s/government’s interest, and not just the shareholder’s/relator’s interest. Further, the main anxiety surrounding SLCs, as
the Delaware Supreme Court has expressed, is that they are acting in their own and fellow board members’ interests rather than
the interest of the corporation.242 This is not a concern with government attorneys. In contrast to the systemic corruption and
“structural bias” that plague SLCs,243 DOJ attorneys are unlikely
to be biased by a desire to shield the government from its misdeeds244 as targets of qui tams are contractors, not the government itself.245 Thus, there is little compelling reason to provide
more robust procedural protections for relators and less deference
to the DOJ. This key distinction speaks strongly against bias concerns that might make courts hesitant to adopt the Auerbach
standard in the corporate context.

241

31 USC § 3730(a).
See Part IV.A.
243 Davis, 90 Iowa L Rev at 1306–09 (2005) (cited in note 222). See also generally
Krishnan, Solomon, and Thomas, How Do Legal Standards Matter? (cited in note 222)
(finding that the greater deference to the SLC, the more likely the SLC is to seek
dismissal).
244 Comparing data in prosecutions and dismissals between administrations and subject areas demonstrates that there is negligible partisan coloring of DOJ dismissal decisions. Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1720–27 (cited in note 20).
245 This is not to say that the DOJ seeking dismissal to protect the government from
its own misdeeds is an unheard-of argument. Ridenour, 397 F3d at 937–38 (explaining the
relators’ accusation that the government sought dismissal to avoid the suit revealing mismanagement of a nuclear facility). However, on balance, the concern of an SLC member
protecting “one of its own” is much more intuitive than the government allowing continued
fraud out of embarrassment for having been defrauded.
242
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Lastly, the business judgment rule and prosecutorial discretion have strikingly similar foundations: both seek to prevent
courts from getting weighed down in fact-intensive, imprecise,
and substantive analysis. The business judgment rule seeks to
keep courts from examining the substance of decisions because
“[q]uestions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or
action, adequacy of consideration, [and] lawful appropriation of
corporate funds to advance corporate interests” are not strong
suits of courts and should be left to the corporation’s directors
even when “the results show that what they did was unwise or
inexpedient.”246 Analogous to a business’s decision not to pursue a
derivative lawsuit is the government’s decision not to prosecute
because “an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly
within its expertise.”247 Further supporting the Executive Judgment Rule are the concerns raised by Swift about the constitutionality of such probing court review. While Zapata jurisdictions
deploy searching review of SLCs’ independence, courts have no
similar reason to expect the DOJ to behave partially. The arguments undergirding Auerbach thus ring even truer in the FCA
context.
C. Textual and Constitutional Support for the Executive
Judgment Rule
As an initial matter, it is useful to remember that neither the
Sequoia approach nor the Swift approach is mandated by the text
of the Act itself. Both are judicially created gap-fillers. Outside of
one approach’s ability to effectuate the purpose of the FCA, there
is no reason to privilege one over the other. This Section argues
that the Executive Judgment Rule not only best maps onto the
text and legislative history of the 1986 Amendment, but also best
resolves the constitutional concerns raised by both current
approaches.

246 Auerbach, 393 NE2d at 1000, quoting Pollitz v Wabash Railroad Company, 100
NE 721, 724 (NY 1912).
247 Chaney, 470 US at 831.
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1. The proposed solution fully embraces the 1986
Amendment’s text.
The Executive Judgment Rule overcomes the superfluidity
shortcomings of Swift by making the provided hearing a meaningful opportunity to object.248 Under the proposed solution, the
hearing would allow the relator to challenge the government’s
procedural conduct of the investigation against the statutory
touchstone of “diligently shall investigate.” Such an approach reflects the Act’s clear instruction that the relator is a coparty, not
simply a tipster, and better comports with the statute’s provision
of a role for the court.
This solution also avoids the shortcomings of Sequoia, which
goes well beyond the statutory language to make inquiry into the
government’s decisional calculus and substantive priorities the
first stop after any relator objection to dismissal. All other provisions but the dismissal portion of the Act provide a standard for
review, strongly implying that the elaborate superstructure
Sequoia built on top of the two words “diligently [ ] investigate”
cannot withstand the canons of expressio unius and meaningful
variation.
2. The proposed solution avoids the constitutional defects
of both current approaches.
While Swift frees the government to deprive relators of their
recognized partial interest in the suit, the proposed solution offers
a minimum level of due process. In fashioning the procedural
safeguards, the Executive Judgment Rule takes its cue from cases
like Eldridge, which state that “due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”249 In attempting to balance the relator’s interest, risk of
erroneous deprivation, and the government’s interest under the
Eldridge test,250 Swift ignores the first two factors. Swift denies
relators any interest, despite that interest being statutorily provided and recognized by the Supreme Court, while also ignoring
248

See Part III.D.1.
Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 481 (1972). As the Court explained in Morrissey,
the flexibility of due process “has been said so often by this Court and others as not to
require citation of authority.” Id. See also Connecticut v Doehr, 501 US 1, 10 (1991), quoting Eldridge, 424 US at 334 (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”); Jason
Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U Pa L Rev 1309, 1319–34 (2012).
250 Eldridge, 424 US at 334–35.
249
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the lack of meaningful review for dismissal and low burden a procedural review of government investigation would impose.
Sequoia, on the other hand, ignores the strong government
interest in control over its laws and prosecutions and, importantly, goes beyond “additional or substitute procedural safeguards”251 in permitting every objecting relator the right to
searching review of the government’s substantive and policy
grounds for seeking dismissal. Sequoia goes past the realm of limited due process that Eldridge contemplates for partial and statutorily provided property interests. And, in doing so, it infringes
on the government’s prosecutorial discretion without clear justification. It is important to remember that the difference between
Swift and Sequoia is not simply that Sequoia offers a hearing.
Where Swift gives essentially no meaningful opportunity to object, Sequoia requires the government, in each case of relator objection, to explain why dismissal is justified by legitimate state
interests. This is not simply another layer of procedural review.
Sequoia forces the government to divulge its cost-benefit analysis,
its regulatory priorities, and its prosecutorial interests in order to
achieve dismissal. This goes beyond what is required in criminal
and agency decisions not to prosecute. Eldridge’s factors should
not be read to impose a duty to divulge in the context of a partial
right under the FCA, especially when such a duty is not demanded even under full due process protections in criminal prosecutions. While judicial review of executive branch action taken
pursuant to the relevant statute is permissible, Chaney makes
clear it is limited to those “guidelines [provided by the statute] for
the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.”252
“[D]iligently [ ] investigate,” however, furnishes no basis for
Sequoia’s requirement that the government explain its substantive reasons for seeking dismissal to the court’s satisfaction.
By contrast, the Executive Judgment Rule guarantees relators a minimum of due process by ensuring the procedure by
which this partial, speculative interest is deprived includes adequate review of the evidence and facts before the government.
This is in line with Chaney, as judicial review is tied directly to
the statutory guideline of diligent investigation imposed by
Congress. Procedural review, not searching substantive probing,
best ensures that the DOJ diligently investigated. No statutory

251
252

Id at 335.
Chaney, 470 US at 833.
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guidelines suggest any further basis for review of the government’s decision to dismiss.
Under the canon of constitutional avoidance, the proposed solution is the clear winner. As this Comment argues, not only does
the solution best map onto the text of the Act, but it also eschews
the constitutional concerns plaguing both current approaches.
Additionally, the Executive Judgment Rule goes beyond simply
addressing the interpretive and constitutional failings of Swift
and Sequoia; it best achieves the entire purpose of the qui tam provision—a claim neither current approach can accurately make.
D. The Executive Judgment Rule Creates the Optimal
Incentives Structure
This Section examines recent literature on the role of pleading standards in the FCA’s incentive structure to argue that the
proposed dismissal standard will lead to higher quality tips for
the government, fewer meritless suits, and greater protection for
meritorious relators.
Although Congress took pains to explain that the incentive
structure is the whole ballgame when it comes to the qui tam provision, neither Swift nor Sequoia courts have grappled with the
poor incentive structures that their rules create. According to the
Senate Report, the entire point of the qui tam provision is to bring
about a “coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry” to combat fraud.253 Neither rule strikes the balance of encouraging meritorious suits while discouraging the proliferation
of meritless and wasteful strategic suits. As argued below, the
Executive Judgment Rule achieves this balance by guaranteeing
serious relators the ability to ensure their complaints are fully
investigated without giving strategic or meritless relators a basis
for misusing the qui tam provision by placing the burden of justification on the government.
1. Altering the dismissal standard affects relators’
incentives.
Recent research on the role of heightened pleading standards
offers a useful basis for understanding the similar role dismissal
standards play.254 Because dismissal standards are just as much
253

S Rep 99-345 at 2 (cited in note 4).
Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of
Qui Tam, 91 Wash U L Rev 1169, 1203 (2014); Michael Lockman, Comment, In Defense of
254
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a part of “the private cost of blowing the whistle”255 as scienter
requirements and retaliation protections, raising the pleading
standard is likely to have similar results to lowering the dismissal
standard. This similarity allows us to apply much of the extant
pleading standards research to the dismissal standards context.
For instance, recent works on the FCA note that a stricter pleading bar “does not diminish relators’ incentives to file high-quality
qui tam suits, but rather serves as a much-needed screening
mechanism to ensure that the DOJ is not flooded with low-quality
tips.”256 That is, even when the system makes it more difficult to
establish their complaint, relators with meritorious cases are not
discouraged from coming forward. This is easily transferable to
the dismissal context. The Executive Judgment Rule guarantees
only that the procedure of the investigation will meet the statutory requirement. Knowing that their case will be fully investigated before a decision is reached, relators with strong claims can
be confident that the value of their claim is seen. By contrast,
those with weak or meritless claims will be discouraged as the
procedural guarantee offers no benefit to them.
The choice of dismissal standard affects the number of suits
brought. This is so because we can expect awareness of dismissal
standards to play a role similar to any other factor attorneys and
relators weigh before bringing suit, especially as the professionalization of the qui tam bar increases.257 When relators know that
they have essentially no ability to meaningfully object to dismissal, as in Swift jurisdictions, they will likely be less willing to risk
time, money, and their livelihoods to bring an uncertain case.
However, where they are certain that not only can they object but
that the government must explain its decisions to the satisfaction
of a court, as in Sequoia jurisdictions, they will be more likely to
bring suit. Though decreasing the relator’s cost of blowing the
whistle may encourage more meritorious whistleblowers to come
forward, it also encourages more relators in general to come
forward.258
Beyond just over- or underencouraging relator suits, a suboptimal dismissal standard also risks incentivizing self-dealing and

a Strict Pleading Standard for False Claims Act Whistleblowers, 82 U Chi L Rev 1559,
1568–69 (2015).
255 Casey and Niblett, 91 Wash U L Rev at 1201 (cited in note 254).
256 Lockman, Comment, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1560 (cited in note 254).
257 See Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1318 (cited in note 20).
258 Casey and Niblett, 91 Wash U L Rev at 1201 (cited in note 254).
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strategic suits among relators. When relators are increasingly
free to pursue claims that the government would otherwise dismiss, they become “monopolists in the production”259 of the settlement or trial, which encourages relators to bring suits solely for
strategic reasons.260 An ulterior motive may not be problematic
when the underlying fraud claim is meritorious. But when the ulterior motive is the only motive, Sequoia risks allowing businesses to sue competitors to force in terrorem settlements, competitors to turn over sensitive information in discovery, and the
government to divulge its regulatory and enforcement priorities.
As qui tam suits are already incredibly expensive—with the average defense cost starting at $250,000261—permitting, and even
encouraging, wasteful and counterproductive suits only further
cuts against Sequoia.
2. The Executive Judgment Rule strikes the optimal
balance of encouraging meritorious suits while
discouraging frivolous suits.
For Swift jurisdictions, this change will encourage relators to
file suit as they can ensure that the government actually engages
with their complaint. As stated above, this assurance of investigation is only appealing to those relators with a complaint that
can stand on its merits.262 Implementing the Executive Judgment
Rule here reassures those who fear summary government dismissal in the wake of the Granston Memo. And, importantly, the
Executive Judgment Rule continues to discourage those without
meritorious claims from bringing costly and unnecessary litigation for strategic purposes—as Sequoia does.
For Sequoia jurisdictions, the Executive Judgment Rule will
better protect serious relators. The rational relation test focuses
solely on the government’s substantive reasoning for dismissal
and does little for a relator concerned that their high-quality tip
will not be fully investigated. Such a relator is better served by
259

Depoorter and De Mot, 14 S Ct Econ Rev at 156 (cited in note 67).
Like in Sequoia, qui tam actions are often brought by competitors or those who
lost out on government bids. Forcing the government to explain its substantive reasoning
may offer a useful avenue for competitors to engage in fishing expeditions regarding the
government’s regulatory, enforcement, or prosecutorial priorities. For a positive spin on
this strategic competition aspect of FCA litigation, see J. Stephen Simms, Robin Page
West, and Vincent J. Columbia Jr, Using the False Claims Act for Competitive Advantage,
30 Md Bar J 29, 31 (1997).
261 Kovacic, 6 S Ct Econ Rev at 225 (cited in note 169).
262 See Part IV.D.1.
260
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the Executive Judgment Rule as it would always allow them to
challenge the government’s fulfillment of the statutorily mandated diligent investigation, regardless of the persuasiveness of
the government’s cost-benefit analysis.263 Furthermore, relators
writ large are likely better served by such a standard. When a
relator asks the court to examine whether a government interest
is rationally related to dismissal, both the relator and the court
are the least informed and skilled parties to the analysis. When a
relator asks the court to evaluate the thoroughness of the government’s investigation, both relator and judge are well informed
and skilled to do so. The relator, as the holder of the complaint
and information, is well suited to know the extent of the government’s investigation into the relator’s allegations. And the court
is well suited to accurately and consistently judge the government’s investigation, as well as any constitutional claims the relator may allege.
The analysis of the current dismissal standards is important
as it undermines the conventional assumption that Sequoia is in
the relator’s best interest and Swift is in the government’s best
interest. Neither of those approaches strikes the proper balance.
Only the Executive Judgment Rule screens low-quality tips by
raising the private cost of litigation while simultaneously incentivizing high-quality tips by guaranteeing a diligent investigation
of those claims. As such, not only is the proposed solution the most
compatible with the text, history, and constitutionality of the
Act, but it best serves the purposes enshrined in the 1986
Amendment.
E. The Rule in Practice: Applying the Executive
Judgment Rule
This Section will examine two recent qui tam dismissal cases
that demonstrate a court’s capacity for implementing the Executive Judgment Rule. The first case shows how a court would actually go about this analysis. The second shows how Sequoia jurisdictions, even where they review the investigation, go too far
beyond the textual and constitutional bounds in burdening the
government with additional hoops to jump through to attain dismissal. Both selected cases are from Sequoia jurisdictions for two
reasons. First, given the extreme deference of Swift jurisdictions,
only egregious deficiencies that amount to “fraud on the court”
263

31 USC § 3730(a).
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are bases for meaningful judicial review. The type of review contemplated by the Executive Judgment Rule sees courts stepping
in well before outright fraud by the government. Second, the
Sequoia court cases here are unique for focusing almost exclusively on procedural review and, in doing so, evidence the ability
of courts to do just that under the Executive Judgment Rule. However, unlike in Sequoia courts, the proposed solution would place
the burden of alleging investigative inadequacy on the relator, not
the government. In doing so, the Executive Judgment Rule addresses the competing textual and constitutional concerns while
still allowing for meaningful judicial review where warranted.
In United States v Academy Mortgage Corp, the relator alleged that Academy Mortgage defrauded the government by
falsely certifying loans.264 The government sought dismissal.265
The court ordered an evidentiary hearing after the relator
provided evidence that the government failed its investigatory
duty by, among other things, refusing to even read her new
complaint.266
The court held that the government failed to meet its burden
to show a rational relation between dismissal and its interests
because its investigation was procedurally defective. The court
found that the government conducted no investigation outside of
interviewing the relator and receiving her documents, “even turning down the Relator’s counsel when he offered to provide additional information.”267 The court specifically noted two investigative failings. First, the government failed to interview key
witnesses. And, second, the data necessary to investigate the complaint resided with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, yet government attorneys refused to request or review it,
even after the relator filed a FOIA request to provide the government with its own information.268 Summing up the failure of the
government to meet the statutory “diligently [ ] investigate” minimum, the court stated that “[w]hatever the precise contours of a
‘full investigation’ may be, the Government has not conducted
such investigation in this case.”269

264
265
266
267
268
269

Academy Mortgage, 2018 WL 3208157 at *1.
Id.
Id at *1–2.
Id at *1.
Academy Mortgage, 2018 WL 3208157 at *2.
Id at *2.
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Though applying Sequoia, the court utilized many of the
same tools that the proposed solution relies on. The basic procedural requirements of investigating the claim, as Auerbach requires, were shown to be missing, so the court held that the government did not establish a rational relationship between
dismissal and its interests. Courts in Sequoia jurisdictions—and
even Swift jurisdictions when relators allege issues of fraud on
the court or other manifest procedural errors—are already performing the type of procedural investigation this proposed solution entails. However, simply incorporating judicial review of
DOJ investigation is not enough. Adding the Executive Judgment
Rule’s analysis to Sequoia does not remedy the textually and constitutionally problematic review that encourages frivolous suits.
Adding the Executive Judgment Rule’s analysis to Swift, but only
in situations of egregious fraud, denies any of the benefits of the
rule and avoids none of Swift’s textual, constitutional, and policy
problems. Under the Executive Judgment Rule, courts’ analyses
would be structured and guided by the statutory anchor of “diligently [ ] investigate.” Only when a relator rebutted the presumption of proper investigation may the court then turn to a more
searching review of the government’s decision. This approach is
attractive not simply because courts are well-placed to do it, but,
crucially, because it fully embraces the text and history of the
1986 Amendment, the Constitution, and the purpose of the qui
tam provision in drawing out strong relators and discouraging
meritless ones.
Another illustrative example is United States ex rel
CIMZNHCA, LLC v UCB, Inc270 (CIMZNHCA). CIMZNHCA is
useful in fleshing out the dividing line between a typical Sequoia
analysis and the proposed solution. In CIMZNHCA the relator
filed eleven claims, all of which the government sought to dismiss.271 In denying the motion, the court held: “The Government’s
claim that it reached this conclusion after having conducted an
extensive investigation was belied by the parties’ briefing and the
evidence adduced during the evidentiary hearing . . . [indicating]
its investigation into the claims specifically asserted in this case
was minimal and it conducted no meaningful cost-benefit
analysis.”272

270
271
272

2019 WL 2409576 (SD Ill).
Id at *1.
Id.
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Under the Executive Judgment Rule, the inadequacy of the
investigation, including the failure to interview crucial witnesses,
is a proper factor, but the lack of “meaningful cost-benefit analysis” is not. A court is well positioned to review the process of factfinding and investigation but is poorly positioned to evaluate
what factors the government should have considered, and what
weight to give them, in its decision to seek dismissal. The improvement over Sequoia is that the court does not, as the first step
after a relator’s objection, launch into a freewheeling investigation of whether the substantive decision was rationally related to
an unlimited and varying set of conditions and government priorities. With a basis in court expertise and the text of the 1986
Amendment, the proposed standard instead wades into the muck
only if the relator shows that the government’s investigation was
procedurally flawed.
Importantly, this is also the inquiry a relator is best positioned to undertake. Unlike substantive decisions, which force relators to guess at the government’s calculus, procedural defects
are more apparent to the relator as the length and depth of review, engagement with provided and suggested sources, and allegations of bad faith are all factors relators, as the government’s
main source of information, are well placed to observe.
The Executive Judgment Rule is an approach courts are well
prepared to implement and that offers a solution to the central
problems of the current approaches. This Rule offers a manageable and highly effective approach that properly balances the textual, legislative history, constitutional, and incentives considerations that the current approaches neglect.
CONCLUSION
This Comment advocates applying the Auerbach approach
used in Special Litigation Committee dismissal reviews to the
context of government motions to dismiss qui tam relator suits.
Auerbach shields an SLC’s decision to dismiss from substantive
review by the court except where the plaintiff can show that the
SLC was procedurally defective. Only once the business judgment
presumption is broken can the court then move on to review of
the decision to dismiss itself. Applied to the FCA context, the
Executive Judgment Rule would permit relators to object to alleged procedural errors in the government’s investigation of the
complaint. If the objection shows a “substantial and particularized need” for a hearing, the court may grant one before passing
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judgment on the procedural defects of the government’s investigation. If defects are found, the relator and court may then subject
the government’s substantive decisions to scrutiny. This solution
is rooted in the False Claims Act’s text, legislative history, constitutional concerns, and policy.
The two standards courts currently use, Swift and Sequoia,
fail to accurately capture the text and purpose of the FCA. Swift
renders the dismissal hearing a nullity, likely in violation of the
relator’s right to due process. Sequoia reads in a potentially unconstitutional burden on the government unsupported by the
text. Similarly, the legislative history rejects Swift’s “unfettered
right” language because Congress intended to expand protection
of relators to encourage suits. The legislative history also rejects
Sequoia’s approach in clearly requiring the government to explain
its decisions only after the relator meets their burden to show a
need for a hearing. Additionally, though not perfectly clear, the
text and legislative history generally focus on procedural and constitutional concerns, rather than call for freewheeling court review of government policies to address every objection. Constitutionally, the current approaches raise serious concerns for due
process (in stripping partial assignees’ interests without review)
and separation of powers (in burdening the government to explain
itself as a matter of course in every dismissal hearing). Lastly,
even if the approaches lacked these interpretive and constitutional problems, both standards fail to achieve the policy goals
undergirding the FCA’s qui tam provision and, thereby, offer no
solution to the growing crisis of meritless suits.
By contrast, the Executive Judgment Rule gives meaning to
the hearing and relator protection requirements by permitting
procedural review after the relator justifies their objections—unifying the text and history of the 1986 Amendment. By ensuring a
minimum of due process and no greater burdening of government
prosecutorial discretion than is allowed in other contexts, the proposed solution neatly threads the constitutional needle in avoiding the concerns of either extreme. Lastly, the Executive Judgment Rule dually encourages high-quality tips and discourages
low-quality tips by guaranteeing procedural protections.
The Executive Judgment Rule is not about interpretive hairsplitting or harmonizing for the sake of harmonizing. It is about
respecting the valid, competing claims of the government and relators and harnessing these interests to achieve the greatest net
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benefit. The force of the Executive Judgment Rule is not constrained to the FCA either. With almost every state having its
own False Claims Act and numerous other qui tam provisions dotting the federal and state statutory landscape, this Rule offers a
compelling means of optimizing whistleblower and qui tam statutes across industries and jurisdictions.

